Central European Journal of Communication

Editors: Michał Głowacki & Róża Smolak

Central European Journal of Communication

EDITORIAL BOARD

Professor Walery Pisarek
(1931–2017)

In memoriam

On behalf of the editors of *Central European Journal of Communication* (CEJC) and members of the CEJC Editorial Board we express deep sadness over the passing away of Professor Walery Pisarek. We have lost our mentor, one of the leading Polish scholars, the most prominent media researcher and one of the first Polish scholars interested in language and communications. During his academic life and career Professor Walery Pisarek served as a role model for all of us; the great scientist who was always open for collaboration other colleagues and students, always acting in helpful and friendly ways.

Professor Walery Pisarek was one of the founders of the Polish Communication Association (PCA). In 2008 he received Honorary Membership of PCA for outstanding academic achievements and promotion of media research in Poland and other countries. Professor Pisarek served as a member of Editorial Board of *Central European Journal of Communication.* It was honour to build on His valued advice and knowledge.

Professor Walery Pisarek passed away November 5, 2017. He will be greatly missed.

Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska and Michał Głowacki
Editors of *Central European Journal of Communication*

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Professor Walery Pisarek was a founding member of the Polish Communication Association and as first among distinguished media researchers became in 2008 Honorary Member of our Association. We were profoundly convinced of this commendation, because Professor had remarkable merit in rising and giving direction to media science in Poland, created bases of methodology, explicitly undertaking problems of changes in communication process. He also shared his didactic experience. He engaged in discussion about necessity of separate media science discipline, pointing potential research field. He was our Authority, and it means more than Senior. He had ability of speaking finely and arguing convincingly. He had his own opinion, but also was respectful for others' view. Humble and kind, He was giving us attention and concern. Right and noble, He never refused review or consultation requests. He always had time for Association, participating in numerous conferences and congresses. He supported community of media experts, kindly patronizing Association's research sections.

We accepted His loss with emotion and regret.

Iwona Hofman
President of the Polish Communication Association

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Professor Walery Pisarek — the nestor of Polish media studies — died in Katowice on Sunday, November 5, 2017. Some fifteen minutes prior to giving a speech praising Jacek Bocheński, this year's winner of the "Ambassador of the Polish Language" prize — a heart attack ended the long, eighty-six year lifespan of the Professor. Professor Pisarek's life was full of trying experiences — during the 1950s, those people who founded underground organizations were cruelly treated by the communist authorities, and he was sentenced to work in the coal mines for several years. From 1958 (the start of his employment in the Ośrodek Badań Prasoznawczych (the Press Research Center), he was able to concentrate on a reliable, painstaking, and exceptionally fruitful academic research of the press.

He was the Chairman of the Council of the Polish Language at the presidium of the PAN (Polish Academy of Sciences) from 1996–2000 — and later he was Honorary Chairman. In the period of 1969–2001, he directed the Press Research Center, and from 1991–2012 he edited the *Zeszyte Prasoznawcze*, which in practice amounted to having a decisive influence on the development of this realm of research throughout Poland. He organized the basis for obtaining information and analyzing the content of the press in *Metoda analizy zawartości prasy* (Method of Analyzing the Content of the Press). He organized journalistic rhetoric in Poland in *Retoryka dziennikarska* (Journalistic Rhetoric) and *Nowa retoryka dziennikarska* (New Journalistic Rhetoric). He created press and quantitative linguistics in Poland *Frekwencja wyrazów w prasie. Wiadomości, komentarze i reportaże* (The Frequency of Words in the Press — News Commentary and Reporting). His work *Poznać prasę po nagłówkach* (Meet the Press Through the Headlines), concerning headlines and advertisements in the press from the 1960s is in fact the first analysis on this discourse in Poland. He also wrote the first modern handbook in Polish on communication studies — *Wstęp do nauki o komunikowaniu* (Introduction to Communication Studies).

In addition, these achievements were the result of several decades of strenuous empirical research conducted by the Professor. For years he itemized filing cards, tallied up results, and counted the number of words. In general, when we consider what we most esteem about the professor, it is our respect for this simple but often technical or mechanical work as well. The Professor managed to sum up, on his own, the results of an analysis of contents, proofread a text for *Zeszyty Prasoznwcze* and reedit a book for someone, because he couldn't imagine reading something without simultaneously correcting any error. And he wrote reviews as well — officially or unofficially — and he did this quite often, as he rarely refused his academic assistance to any young university students or employees.

The profession of being a scholar has various visages and representatives. Professor Pisarek was a model representative of academia. He never looked down upon any knowledge, and procedure, nor on any person, because he knew that

"everybody has a story" and hence, their own knowledge, which may be used to help others in some way. He also never divided people and their work "in advance" into those which are useful and useless. There simply wasn't an iota of institutional pride in him. There was also nothing that he ever grew tired, that he wanted to take a rest, or to consider lowering the demands he set for himself.

Therefore, if one would like to clearly indicate the benefit which the young generation of academics gained from him, one could say outright — that it was the exceptionally rare, in practice, possibility of "being in contact with someone who was the ideal of a scholar and director".

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Wojciech Kajtoch
Editor of *Zeszyty Prasoznawcze*
Agnieszka Hess
Director of Institute of Journalism, Jagiellonian University in Cracow

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I belong to the generation which was lucky enough to be in the academic environment of the Professor Walery Pisarek. I can still find his signature in my students record book from the sixties in Katowice, when he taught me Polish grammar on the university course. At that time he was preparing in Katowice his doctoral dissertation on "The Headline of the press statement in the linguistic lighting". He was able to explain awfully boring formulas and comment in such interesting context of funny examples of breaking language rules, that these seemingly unappealing classes were always full of students, who weren't forced by the time-sheet. Over the years, it was in the seventies when the Professor's oratorical talent in fighting for the correctness of expression in Polish language was recognized by all Poles watching his "*language chat*" on the "Studio 2" TV programme.

We — Poles — have entered the world's media organizations as the Polish media environment mostly thanks to Professor. It was Him who has been paving our way to acquire contacts with world-class mass communication authorities. Having participated in several international conferences organized by the International Association for Mass Communication Research (IAMCR / AIERI) — a research organization affiliated to UNESCO, professor Walery Pisarek became an icon of Polish media in this organization. When I was at the X Congress of the IAMCR in Leicester (UK) in 1976, I was amazed to see how the Professor was surrounded and friendly-close with delegates-scientists from almost all over the world. He was there known as a fellow researcher, friend and a walking encyclopedia about the press markets not only in Poland. Not surprisingly he was elected at that time unanimously as the vice-president of the IAMCR and served until 1988. In the year of 1978 we jointly organized the XI IAMCR Congress in Warsaw, and without His wise advice and warnings against various conflict situations, this world conference

would not be rated as a Polish success. Nowadays, we can speak proudly of the serious development of the Polish media environment mostly thanks to the activity of Walery Pisarek here in Poland and in many international forums.

The Professor was never the member of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), which ruled in all the spheres of life in the People's Republic of Poland. Nevertheless, since 1969 he was a long-time director of the Center for Media Studies at the RSW "Prasa-Książka-Ruch" — the publishing cooperative of PUWP. He was such an outstanding expert in the press market in Poland and in the world, also highly regarded for his objectivity, authority and expert in national and international mass communication research, that none of the academic/college PUWP members could not compare to him. The Professor had the talent to communicate with each and every person He met. By maintaining a gentleman's distance, He was able to imply that he respected everyone, even if he had completely different views and represented a different system of values. I also admired the Professor for his ability to control his own emotions and to professionally isolate the feelings of the great harm He encountered in Poland during the period of cruel Stalin's system. "I am running away from martyrdom" — He used to say when criminal themes of the post-war history of forming People's Republic of Poland appeared in the discussion.

"Whatever I do in life, I try to do it best" — this life motto of Professor Walery Pisarek is worth remembering too. Regardless of the personality of the magnificent Man like the Professor was.

Jerzy Olędzki
Professor of University of Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński in Warsaw

In the spiral of mistrust: On the decline of public trust in Czech journalists

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Jaromír Volek

Marína Urbániková

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ABSTRACT: This paper analyses the change of public trust in journalists in the Czech Republic and investigates the main characteristics of mistrusting audiences. Comparative analysis based on two representative surveys of the Czech population reveals that public trust in journalists declined by a third between 2004 and 2016. Mistrust is on the rise especially among: (a) socio-economically deprived media consumers (b) with leftist political orientation c) belonging to the youngest cohort. The analysis also indicates a split of the ideal-typical image of a journalist as a highly-educated advocate of socially vulnerable groups, and suggests the return of a perception of journalists as establishment representatives which prevailed during the previous "real socialist" regime.

KEYWORDS: Czech journalists, mistrusting audiences, political orientation, trust.

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INTRODUCTION

Having the trust of the audience is of fundamental importance for media and journalists, and in a broader perspective, also for the democracy and stability of social systems. Trust constitutes a key working tool of journalists without which they cannot, in fact, appear in the field and make contacts with their sources. Trust of the audiences is also crucial for the commercial sustainability of the media. Moreover, the media serve as an intermediary between the government and the people, they provide them with information and act as a forum for the views of citizens. The lack of trust in this forum can therefore be a potential threat for democracy. Finally, media and journalists do not only depend on the trust of their audiences, they also play an important role in the process of building trust in other parts of society. Trust is a basis for social cohesion and social order (Gellner, 1990) and it is required as an input condition for functioning of a social system (Luhmann, 1990); without trust, the stability of the social system is at risk. Therefore, erosion of trust in the media and journalists can have far-reaching consequences.

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Paradoxically, it seems that in the times of journalism's greatest technological explosion, public trust as its vital component is on the decline. A number of studies affirm the increasingly skeptical attitude of the public to the until recently accepted journalistic privilege to explicate social reality (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001). This process of weakening trust in the media concerns different media systems with varying intensity. For instance, Gronke and Cook (2007) show that, between 1973 and 2000, the trust of the public in the US media sank more than trust in any other observed professions. According to a recent Gallup Poll (2016), trust and confidence in the media among American public has fallen to the lowest point in the poll's 44-year history, with only 32% saying they have a great deal or fair amount of trust in the media. Muller (2013) points out that the biggest slump in trust can be detected in countries which, according to the typology of Hallin and Mancini (2004), belong to the North Atlantic/liberal media system. In contrast, quite stable trust prevails in countries with Mediterranean/polarized pluralistic models and in countries with North and Central Europe/democratic-corporatist models.

In the European Union, trust in the media has been falling systematically in the past eight years in both old EU countries and new ones (Eurobarometer, 2016)[1]. However, the fall in trust in the latter is more distinctive, exceeding 10%. While in 2007, 61% of respondents from both old and new member states tended to trust the media, by 2015, this number had decreased to 54% in the case of respondents from old member states and 48% in the case of respondents from new member states. This suggests that in post-communist countries, public trust is more fragile in comparison with stable Western democracies.

Although a number of recent studies affirm a rising public mistrust in media and journalists, they usually focus on the most developed Euro-American countries. This paper brings unique data showing that this trend also applies to the Czech Republic as a Central European country with a post-communist media model. It compares the level of public trust in journalists in the Czech Republic within the time span of twelve years (2004–2016), and analyzes the main characteristics and structure of mistrusting audiences.

THE RISE AND FALL OF PUBLIC TRUST IN CZECH MEDIA

According to cultural theories, trust in people and in institutions is a product of accumulated historical experiences (Sztompka, 2000), and it is intergenerationally

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[1] The author's calculation based on Eurobarometer (2016) results. Trust in media was calculated as an average of trust in TV, radio, and press. Question wording: *I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions [the press, television, radio, the internet], please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?* Possible answers: tend to trust; tend not to trust. Old EU members = Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. New EU members = Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.

transmitted and deeply embedded in society (Mishler & Rose, 2005). The question of public trust in media and journalists in the Czech Republic has to be therefore considered in a broader context of its history and the transformation of society after the fall of the totalitarian regime (also known under the catchphrase "real socialism") in 1989.

The previous regime, as well as the transformation process of so-called post-communist societies, are thought to have caused a widespread erosion of trust in Central and Eastern European countries, including the Czech Republic (see for example Mierina, 2011). According to Sztompka (2000), communist societies developed a 'bloc culture' with various traits and characteristics leading to the decay of trust, e.g., the distinction between public sphere (domain of the bad) and private sphere (domain of the good) going hand in hand with the double standards of truth (official and private), or autocratic style of politics with arbitrary policies and unclear criteria of political decisions. Trusting the state and its political institutions, including media and journalists, was seen as naive and stupid, and, on the other hand, trying to beat the system and outwit the authorities was widely recognized as a virtue. Therefore, as put by Rose (1994, p. 18), distrust can be considered as "a pervasive legacy of communist rule".

The fall of the communist regime and the democratic replacement of the old and distrusted regime brought a wave of national unity and solidarity, as well as a revival of public trust. This was only temporary, as the pains of the transformation process with its radical political, economic, and societal changes led to the 'post-revolutionary malaise' or 'the morning after syndrome' (Sztompka, 1992), and with that to a profound collapse of trust (Sztompka, 2000). Rigid social controls were released, old norms have fallen down, and new ones have not yet been developed, and emergence of new life chances generated brutal competition with unclear rules (Sztompka, 2000). However, the consolidation of political democracy, economic growth and the inclusion into Western alliances, together with generational turnover, initiated a gradual revival of trust (Sztompka, 2000).

Naturally, Czech media and journalists did not stand unaffected by this historical development. After World War II, the Czech journalistic field was formed under the direct influence of the so-called Soviet theory of journalism, which saw journalism primarily as a propaganda activity aimed at educating citizens to be loyal to the communist establishment and the Communist Party as the leading force, which has the right "when journalist activity does not correspond to its demands, to strip him of the right to speak on its behalf, or may choose other means to influence him" (Tepljuk, 1989). Although there are no data on public trust in journalists from the pre-1989 period, it can be assumed that especially in the last decade before the transition it was at a low level. The Czech public, for instance, projected this kind of mistrust into a saying popular at the end of the 1980s: 'Czech TV lies like *Rudé právo* prints'[2].

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[2] *Red Justice* or *Red Truth* was the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Czech television broadcasting was controlled by the state under the old regime. The slogan plays on a Czech idiom: to lie like they print (= to lie extensively/obviously).

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After 1989, public trust in journalists and media has been at least partially restored, only to experience a decline starting after the onset of the economic crisis in 2008. As a proxy indicator for missing data on public trust before 1995, a continual measurement of prestige of the journalistic profession among the Czech public starting in 1990 can be used. It shows a significant increase in perceived prestige in the years shortly after the revolution and relatively stable values until the arrival of the economic crisis (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Prestige of journalism as a profession in the Czech Republic, 1990–2016 (in %)

Source: Czech Social Science Data Archive of the Czech Institute of Sociology; the authors' calculation.

Legend: The data in the figure represent the average score of prestige on a scale from 1 = the lowest prestige to 99 = the highest prestige.

The regular assessment of public trust in media started in 1995. As demonstrated in Figure 2, the first noticeable drop in public trust was distinguishable as early as in 2001–2002. It increased in 2007, and accelerated in 2009 when the first tangible impact of the economic crisis appeared; the progression of mistrust affected all the media types.

Although there is a continual measurement of public trust in media, it is necessary to distinguish between public trust in media and in journalists, since trust in institutions can differ from trust in individuals (see, e.g., Newman et al., 2016). Investigation of public trust in journalists is still missing in the Czech Republic. This paper aims to fill in the gap and report on the change of trust in journalists among the Czech population, as well as on the structure and main characteristics of mistrusting audiences.

PUBLIC TRUST IN NEWS MEDIA AND JOURNALISTS: LITERATURE REVIEW

The research on public trust in the journalistic field monitors two main topics: a) analysis of trust in media institutions, usually conducted through a comparison of individual media types, and b) less frequent research on the trust in journalists as a socio-professional group.

Figure 2. Trust in selected media types in the Czech Republic, 1995–2015 (in %)

Source: CVVM (2015).

Legend: The data in the figure represent the sum of the answers *I definitely trust* and *I rather trust* as a percentage. Question wording: *Please tell us, do you trust or distrust a) the press, b) TV, c) radio, d) internet?* Possible answers: I definitely trust, I rather trust, I rather distrust, I definitely distrust.

Concerning the main characteristics of mistrusting audiences, according to the previous studies, trust in news organizations, journalists, and the news does not map particularly well onto socio-demographic variables (Jackob, 2010; Newman et al., 2016) and the findings are often inconsistent in this respect (Tsfati & Ariely, 2014). This applies especially to age: while older research suggested that young people were less likely to trust media and journalists (Westley & Severin, 1964; Carter & Greenberg, 1965; Greenberg, 1966), newer studies from various countries come to an exactly opposite conclusion (Newman et al., 2016; Gallup, 2016).

Among the most frequently tested characteristics of mistrusting audience are values and ideological attitudes (Gunther, 1992; Hoffner & Rehkoff, 2011; Lee 2005; Lee, 2010). A number of studies pose the question of whether, and to what extent, are journalists' political stances related to public trust in media and journalists (Dennis, 1997; Domke et al., 1999; Farnsworth & Lichter, 2011). Previous research indicates that the stronger the group identification or the stronger the ideological stand of media consumers, the higher their mistrust in specific media as the bearers of opposing attitudes. This kind of mistrust is rising especially among individuals advocating extreme ideologically-structured mindsets — strong conservatives, socialists, and liberals are distinctively less trustful (Glynn & Huge, 2014; Lee, 2005; Lee, 2010). This mistrust is often further incited by criticisms of the media expressed by representatives of political parties in order to spread mistrust among their supporters/followers.

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Another frequent research topic is related to the extent of consumption of specific media types and attempts to answer the question whether trust rises with the amount of media consumption (Johnson & Kaye, 1998; Kiousis, 2001). Most studies confirm the assumption that the more audiences trust mainstream media, the more of their news coverage they consume, and vice versa (Tsfati & Cappella, 2003). The theory of selective exposure (Sullivan, 2009; Bryant & Davies, 2009; Smith et al., 2008) is effective here; it presumes that media consumers favor the sources that they trust as they support their political attitudes, simultaneously fueling mistrust in the media that advocate other values. The role of this selectivity has been tested and confirmed on all standardly employed sociodemographic levels. It appears that those who despise journalists and mainstream media tend to look for alternative sources. Conversely those who trust media are more likely to trust them the following day and the following year (Tsfati, 2003). Audiences who are generally mistrustful consume mainstream media less (Tsfati & Cappella, 2003).

Based on the results of these studies, when examining the structure of mistrusting audiences, the following characteristics should be taken into consideration: a) socio-demographic variables — age, education, and social status; b) the amount of news coverage consumption; and c) values (political) orientation, especially extreme political attitudes (the far right/left).

METHODOLOGY

The following research question was posed: How has the level of public trust in Czech journalists changed in the last decade, and what is the structure and main characteristics of mistrustful audiences? As shown (Figure 2), the Czech Republic is no exception to the trend of decreasing public trust in media measured in various media systems (Gallup Poll, 2016; Eurobarometer, 2016). It was assumed that public trust in journalists would follow the decrease of public trust in media as well as the decrease in prestige of the journalistic profession in the Czech Republic, and that public trust in journalists would drop between 2004 and 2016 (hypothesis 1). Regarding the structure of mistrustful audiences, the study focused on 1) generational socio-demographic characteristics, including education and socio-economic position, 2) the amount of media consumption of respondents, and 3) value (political) orientation and its intensity. Based on the above-mentioned previous studies, the hypotheses related to the predictors of mis/trust were set in the following way:

H2. The mistrust of journalists will decrease with the age of the respondents.

H3. The mistrust of journalists will increase with the decrease of news media consumption.

H4. The mistrust of journalists will be the strongest with advocates of left-wing attitudes.

H5. The mistrust of journalists will be strongest with advocates of extreme political attitudes (far right/left).

The study is based on a quantitative comparative analysis of data from two surveys designed by the authors as a part of the research project [Czech Journalists in a Comparative Perspective: Analysing the process of professionalization, professional socialization, and professional career]. The surveys were conducted with a twelve-year interval, the first data collection took place in February and March of 2004, the other in February and March of 2016. Both data sets are representative for the Czech 18+ population. The sampling was based on socio-demographic quota selection (gender, education, age, region, settlement size, socio-economic position) reflecting the structure of the Czech population. In all, 1,084 respondents were surveyed in 2004, and 1,236 were surveyed in 2016. The data were collected by social research companies according to the instructions of the authors; in both cases, the CAPI data collection strategy was used.

FINDINGS

As expected, the level of Czech public trust in journalists declined significantly between 2004 and 2016. The share of trusting respondents decreased by a third (from 47% to 29%), and the share of mistrustful respondents increased significantly from 19% to 46%. These results correspond to the above-mentioned decrease of prestige of the journalistic profession (Figure 1) and of public trust in media (Figure 2). Moreover, they are in line with previous studies affirming the increasingly skeptical attitude of the public toward journalists in the most developed western countries (e.g. Tsfati & Peri, 2006; Gronke & Cook, 2007; Lee, 2010; Muller, 2013; Gallup Poll, 2016).

Figure 3. Public trust in Czech journalists, 2004–2016

Source: Authors.

Legend: Question wording: *To what extent do you trust the representatives of these professions [journalists]? Use a seven-point scale, where 1 means definitely trust and 7 means definitely distrust. Use any number on a seven-point scale that best reflects your opinion.*

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MISTRUST IN JOURNALISTS AS A SIGNAL OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION OF THE YOUNGEST MEDIA CONSUMERS

Untrustworthy media lose their audiences; commercial media also risk the loss of their advertisers to whom they sell their readers, viewers, and listeners. In other words, public trust constitutes a key condition of economic sustainability, especially of commercial media.

In this respect, this study confirms the findings of previous studies which repeatedly present a high correlation between mistrust in journalists or in media and low rates/measurements of their consumption (e.g., Tsfati & Cappella, 2003). Table 1 shows that mistrust is most closely associated with the lowest measure of news media consumption. It is the measure which is reported by the youngest respondents, the best educated respondents, and the respondents with the highest income.

Table 1. Measure of mis/trust in journalists according to media consumption intensity (2016)

		Definitely + rather trust	Neither trust nor mistrust	Definitely + rather mistrust	Total
Heavy consumer	N	101	94	109	304
	%	33.2	30.9	35.9	100
Middle consumer	N	153	125	219	497
	%	30.8	25.2	44.1	100
Light consumer	N	83	78	174	335
	%	24.8	23.3	51.9	100
Total	N	337	297	502	1136
	%	29.7	26.1	44.2	100

Source: Authors.

Association Gamma coefficient = 0.153**; statistically significant at the level α = 0.01.

Legend: The respondents were categorized into heavy/middle/light consumers according to their score in the index of consumption. The index was based on the level of consumption of news coverage in the daily press, TV, radio, and internet (daily = 5 pts, 3–5 times per week = 4 pts, 1–2 times per week = 3 pts, less often = 2 pts, exceptionally = 1 pt). The index ranges from 4 (the lowest possible media consumption) to 20 (the highest possible media consumption); light consumers = 4–9 pts, middle consumers = 10–14 pts, heavy consumers = 15–20 pts.

Especially significant are the noticeable changes in the structure of the mistrustful in 2004 and 2016 (Tables 2 and 3). One fifth (18%) of the mistrustful in the youngest target group in 2004 increased to more than one half. Consequently, it seems that, within the last decade, mistrustful media consumers became considerably younger. Simultaneously, they no longer belong to the formally best-educated respondents, who should exhibit a higher level of critical media literacy. On the contrary, the mistrust grew most distinctively with the consumers with the lowest formal education — from 19% to 49%. This striking shift implies that journalists working for mainstream media are losing their, in the long-term view, most

important audiences from both an economic perspective (young media consumers) and democratic participation perspective (less- educated media consumers).

Table 2. Measure of mis/trust in journalists according to age and survey year

		2016			2004		
		Definitely + rather trust	Neither trust nor mistrust	Definitely + rather mistrust	Definitely + rather trust	Neither trust nor mistrust	Definitely + rather mistrust
18-29	N	55	48	116	124	90	46
	%	25.1	21.9	53.0	47.7	34.6	17.7
30-39	N	73	68	96	89	74	29
	%	30.8	28.7	40.5	46.4	38.5	15.1
40-49	N	51	56	109	112	77	47
	%	23.6	25.9	50.5	47.5	32.6	19.9
50-59	N	59	50	82	74	59	40
	%	30.9	26.2	42.9	42.8	34.1	23.1
60+	N	111	91	159	115	69	39
	%	30.7	25.2	44.0	51.6	30.9	17.5
Total	N	350	313	562	514	369	201
	%	28.6	25.6	45.9	47.4	34.0	18.5

Source: Authors.

Table 3. Measure of mis/trust in journalists according to education and survey year

		2016			2004		
		Definitely + rather trust	Neither trust nor mistrust	Definitely + rather mistrust	Definitely + rather trust	Neither trust nor mistrust	Definitely + rather mistrust
Primary	N	44	41	80	60	40	23
	%	26.7	24.8	48.5	48.8	32.5	18.7
Secondary without the school leaving exam	N	119	114	198	216	139	65
	%	27.6	26.5	45.9	51.4	33.1	15.5
Secondary with the school leaving exam	N	131	102	187	191	151	80
	%	31.2	24.3	44.5	45.3	35.8	19.0
University education	N	55	56	98	47	39	33
	%	26.3	26.8	46.9	39.5	32.8	27.7
Total	N	349	313	563	514	369	201
	%	28.5	25.6	46.0	47.4	34.0	18.5%

Source: Authors.

Apart from the above-stated characteristics, a higher level of mistrust is also associated with lower social position, with an example of low-income respondents who are either unemployed or students (Tables 4 and 5). This basic socio-demographic description of the mistrusting audiences shows that the journalists working for 'big media' are mistrusted by those respondents who, in one way or another, appear on the margins of society. These findings appear throughout our study and hint that mainstream media and mainstream media journalists are accepted by those who are socially and economically quite successful. The simultaneous rise of mistrust among the youngest and the least educated respondents is highly significant.

Table 4. Measure of mis/trust in journalists according to the head of household income (2016)

		Definitely + rather trust	Neither trust nor mistrust	Definitely + rather mistrust	Total
Up to 10.000 CZK (~ 370 €)	N	12	8	33	53
	%	22.6	15.1	62.3	100
10.001–20.000 CZK (~ 371–738 €)	N	132	103	169	404
	%	32.7	25.5	41.8	100
20.001–30.000 CZK (~ 739–1.106 €)	N	65	78	117	260
	%	25.0	30.0	45.0	100
30.001 CZK and more (~ 1.107 €)	N	15	25	35	75
	%	20.0	33.3	46.7	100
Total	N	224	214	354	792
	%	28.3	27.0	44.7	100

Source: Authors.

Legend: for conversion of Czech currency to Euro we used the following exchange rate: 1 Euro = 27.40 CZK.

Table 5. Measure of mis/trust in journalists according to employment position (2016)

		Definitely + rather trust	Neither trust nor mistrust	Definitely + rather mistrust	Total
Employee	N	160	147	264	571
	%	28.0	25.7	46.2	100
Freelance	N	32	35	50	117
	%	27.4	29.9	42.7	100
Unemployed	N	9	8	35	52
	%	17.3	15.4	67.3	100

OAP	N	117	87	145	349
	%	33.5	24.9	41.5	100
Student	N	18	18	43	79
	%	22.8	22.8	54.4	100
Others	N	14	20	26	60
	%	23.3	33.3	43.3	100
Total	N	350	315	563	1228
	%	28.5	25.7	45.8	100

Source: Authors.

Cramer's association coefficient V = 0.09**; statistically significant at the level α = 0.05.

The results show a structure of mistrust, determined by age, education, and socio-economic conditions, a structure which encloses especially the young, socially weak, and least (formally) educated media consumers, whose inferior social position increases their mistrust in mainstream media and mainstream media journalists.

MISTRUST IN JOURNALISTS AS THE RESULT OF ASYMMETRY BETWEEN THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF JOURNALISTS AND THAT OF THE CONSUMERS OF MEDIA PRODUCTS

The role of the value orientation or political preferences of the media and journalists, or the measure of their agreement with the preferences of potential consumers, is a well-researched topic (Dennis, 1997; Farnsworth & Lichter, 2011; Gunther, 1992; Hoffner & Rehkoff, 2011; Lee, 2005; Lee, 2010). As mentioned earlier, the theory of selective exposure is one of the dominant explanatory frames for this study; this theory holds that media consumers select the sources that they trust or that support their political attitudes.

Research data from the Czech Republic leads to a similar interpretation. Higher mistrust in journalists was declared by left-wing oriented respondents (Table 6), who moderately prevail in the population (as shown in Figure 4). A value asymmetry can be found in the Czech public media space — left-wing respondents prevail in the adult population; middle-right liberal ideology prevails among journalists.

Although the comparison of the newest political preferences of journalists (2016) with the data from 2004 shows that this value disproportion has been diminishing in the last decade, the stated asymmetry remains. Left-wing consumers perceive it as an expression of insufficient representation of their interests, and their mistrust in journalists is growing. It seems that while Czech journalists have been moving from right-wing to center positions in the last decade, a major part of society has been heading to the left.

Table 6. Mis/trust in journalists according to the political orientation of respondents (2016)

		Definitely + rather trust	Neither trust nor mistrust	Definitely + rather mistrust
Left-wing	N	122	86	213
	%	29.0	20.4	50.6
Centre	N	113	127	191
	%	26.2	29.5	44.3
Right-wing	N	108	97	155
	%	30.0	26.9	43.1
Total	N	343	310	559
	%	28.3	25.6	46.1

Source: Authors.

Legend: Political orientation was measured on a seven-point scale (question wording: *Terms "right" and "left" are often used in politics. Where would you place yourself on a seven-point scale?*). The values 1, 2, 3 were recoded as left-wing; the values 5, 6, 7 were coded as right-wing. The center is represented by the value 4.

Figure 4. Self-categorization of Czech journalists on the scale "right-wing" and "left-wing"

Source: Authors.

Legend: Political orientation was measured on a seven-point scale (question wording: *Terms "right" and "left" are often used in politics. Where would you place yourself on a seven-point scale?*). The values 1, 2, 3 were recoded as left-wing in the figure; the values 5, 6, 7 were coded as right-wing. The center is represented by the value 4.

In accordance with hypothesis 4 and 5, mistrust in journalists is strongest with the advocates of extreme left-wing attitudes. The more identified media consumers are with extreme positions, the more probable their increase of mistrust in the

mainstream media (Glynn & Huge, 2014; Lee, 2005; 2010). As Table 7 shows, the strongest mistrust was reported by extreme left-wing respondents, whereas the mistrust of extreme right-wing consumers stays below the average of the whole population. This may be a reflection of the right-wing liberal political preferences widely held by Czech journalists.

Table 7. Measure of mis/trust in journalists according to their political orientation — extreme positions (2016)

		Definitely + rather trust	Neither trust nor mistrust	Definitely + rather mistrust
Extreme left-wing position	N	25	17	51
	%	26.9	18.3	54.8
Other than extreme position	N	297	268	475
	%	28.6	25.8	45.7
Extreme right-wing position	N	21	25	32
	%	26.9	32.1	41.0
Total	N	343	310	558
	%	28.3	25.6	46.1

Source: Authors.

Legend: From a seven-point scale measuring political orientation, the values 1 (left-wing position) and 7 (right-wing position) were selected as extremes.

MISTRUST AS A RESULT OF A SPLIT OF THE IDEAL-TYPICAL IMAGE OF A JOURNALIST

The deepening mistrust of journalists cannot be explained only by the value asymmetry between Czech journalists and the Czech population. It seems that this increasing mistrust is also related to broader changes in the current image of journalists and journalism, an image which is perceived by the public as too distant from their actual problems, regardless of their political preferences.

A comparison of the semantic images of Czech journalists measured by a semantic differential instrument, separated by more than a decade, does not show an unequivocally negative transformation (Table 8). Rather, there has been a shift from a fairly idealized image of a journalist to a more polarized perception. This shift is particularly towards a negative assessment — all six negatively defined attributes became stronger. The positive perception is on the decline but four out of six observed categories with a positive valence are supported by more than half of the respondents.

Table 8. Comparison of semantic images of Czech journalists in 2004 and 2016

	2016		2004	
	N	%	N	%
Sensationalistic (Respectable)	556	45.8 (33.6)		
Corruptible (Incorruptible)	418	33.9 (42.0)	364	33.6 (33.6)
Dependent (Independent)	397	32.3 (47.2)	269	24.8 (46.6)
Overpaid (Underpaid)	391	31.8 (20.8)		
Immoral (Moral)	335	27.3 (53.3)	194	17.9 (46.8)
Uneducated (Educated)	318	26.0 (53.6)	52	4.8 (80.2)
Irresponsible (Responsible)	285	23.2 (53.5)	165	15.2 (60.5)
Collaborator (Critical of the regime)	265	21.8 (45.0)		
Idle (Overloaded)	254	20.8 (36.2)		
Cowardly (Courageous)	244	19.9 (54.6)		
Useless (Beneficial)	205	16.7 (65.7)	63	5.8 (77.8)

Source: Authors.

Legend: Question wording: *Which of these characteristics come to your mind when you think of the average Czech journalist? Now I read two contradictory statements. Please tell me to what extent do you think they fit the average Czech journalist. The lower the number you choose, the more you agree with the first statement, the higher the number you select, the more you agree with the other statement.* Possible answers: scale 1 to 7. The values 1–3 were recoded as agreement with the first statement, the values 5–7 were recoded as agreement with the second statement (in brackets in the Table). The percentage expresses the measure of agreement with the category in the semantic differential. The figures missing to 100% reflect an undecided stand.

Almost half of the respondents see Czech journalists as *independent*, which indicates that they do not consider the recent oligarchization phenomenon in Czech media and the engagement in politics of some of the media owners to be a danger to journalistic autonomy. The number of respondents who see journalists as corruptible is also stable, even though it is still rated as their second most negative attribute.

A more distinct or dynamic change can be traced in the perception of the *benefit* of journalists and especially in the perception of their *erudition*, which represented the strongest attribute of their semantic image more than a decade ago. The perception of the *responsibility* of journalists has also slightly declined, which is probably connected with their strongest negative attribute — low *respectability*, or strong *sensationalism*, about which almost half (46%) of the respondents are convinced. This category was included in the semantic differential only in the latest research, therefore it is not possible to make comparisons as with some other concepts. Some of the categories correspond with the decline of both journalists' erudition and their social benefit, and with the intensifying perception of journalistic work as irresponsible. Despite this shift to a more critical observation, it can still be stated that many

respondents do not really know what to think about journalism. They are in doubt as to whether it is an overpaid, extremely time-consuming and overburdening activity, or a well-paid cozy job.

The comparison of semantic differentials implies that the mythologized and relatively homogeneous picture of Czech journalists is falling into ruin in the eyes of the public. The ideal-typical film or fictional/literary image of journalists as 'ardent reporters' — people who do not care how many more hours they work, who live in near poverty, and who protect the public from an inhumane regime — has begun to fall apart and its outlines have blurred. Only one rather bright attribute of the journalistic image has remained: the public acknowledges that journalists need to be bold to some extent. This in turn weakens an important component in the ontological security of media consumers, who no longer reward journalists for their calculable conduct in the role of guardians of their interests. This splitting image of journalists entails the deterioration of their perceived trustworthiness.

This process of professional image splitting has several causes. One of the most important may stem from the current trend of media fragmentation and the contamination of the image of journalists by the invasion of technologically competent but amateur web journalists who have no respect for professional rules. It is a symptom of a new professional liquidity, which is disintegrating the more traditional, firmly fixed social position of journalists, who have lived their professional lives by strictly defined professional rules. The weakening of this social position and professional rules creates a situation in which journalism is increasingly open to deprofessionalization, which media consumers criticize and signify as a tabloidization, weakening professional responsibility, and the decline of the image of the journalist as a beneficial intellectual.

MULTI-DIMENSIONAL STRUCTURE OF MISTRUSTFUL AUDIENCES

To capture the structure of mistrustful public, to identify homogenous groups of mistrustful respondents, and to explore their similarities, differences and overall size, cluster analysis was chosen (Table 9), into which only mistrustful respondents were included. The given three-clustered solution indicates that mistrustful audiences come from relatively independent social groups structured by age, values, income, education, and by the measure of media consumption. This mistrust born from such a broad socio-cultural spectrum is for the authority of journalists, and thus also for news media, more dangerous than their rejection by one socio-economic or political segment of the population.

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Table 9. Clusters of mistrust: values, age, education, income and consumption attributes

	I. Cluster	II. Cluster	III. Cluster	Total
Left-wing	.43	.23	.61	.41
Right-wing	.28	.27	.18	.25
Centre	.29	.50	.22	.34
Age 18–39	.00	1.00	.07	.38
Age 40–59	1.00	.00	.00	.35
Age 60+	.00	.00	.93	.26
Elementary education + training without the school-leaving exam exam	.46	.35	.54	.44
Secondary education with the school-leaving exam	.38	.45	.23	.44
University/college education	.16	.21	.23	.20
With a low income	.18	.13	.47	.24
With a middle income	.59	.56	.41	.53
With a high income	.23	.32	.12	.23
Heavy consumers	.23	.16	.36	.24
Average consumers	.50	.39	.44	.44
Weak consumers	.27	.46	.20	.32
Relative and absolute size of the cluster formed of mistrustful respondents	34% (138)	47% (187)	19% (78)	100% (403)

Source: Authors.

Legend: K-means clustering analysis was used. The table depicts the average value of each attribute in individual clusters.

Cluster analysis clearly differentiates political groups and age groups of mistrustful media consumers. There are two *left-wing* clusters, the first one comprising the middle generation, the second one the oldest generation. Both cases involve respondents with the *lowest education*. The first cluster includes *middle-income* respondents, the third includes the older and the *lowest-income* respondents. In both cases, the respondents reported an *average* media consumption. The second, non-left-wing, cluster comprises *the youngest generation of middle-income* respondents who are weak media consumers and validates the research finding that, with part of the audience, mistrust is associated with low media consumption.

This three-clustered solution indicates that the mistrust in journalists is high primarily among the left wing respondents. Part of the youngest generation which

does not acknowledge left-wing values also finds journalists untrustworthy. Both of these groups report low education and social status.

None of the clusters covers the group of the propertied or the university-educated group. The measure of their mistrust is distinctively lower, which indicates that Czech journalists find their reference group in members of this higher-middle class, the affluent and educated media consumers of the middle and older generation. It is possible that they are simultaneously the individuals who have a higher share in the power distribution; if that would be the case, it might be concluded that the mistrust in journalists comes along with the mistrust in their relation to the establishment.

It seems that the outlined value asymmetry, due to the long-term inclination of the greater part of the journalistic community to right-center or liberal values, has started to 'backlash' against journalists in the form of a more markedly declared mistrust. This comes from the left-wing part of the audience who may react to the feeling of asymmetrical representation of their values and from others.

However, it can be assumed that this decline in trust cannot be related only to journalistic professional behavior. It is probable that the crisis of trust in the journalistic profession is part of a more general process of growing mistrust in public institutions as such (Norris, 1999). The increasing lack of public trust in journalists as of the *significant others* (Mead, 1934), the actors of public and ergo also of political life, is one of the indicators of the accelerating spiral of mistrust between the public and the political representation.

DISCUSSION

In the last two decades, the trust in media and journalists has been on the decline in most developed post-industrial societies. There is more than one reason for the current situation, and Czech journalists share some of these reasons with journalistic communities of highly developed media landscapes. This is probably due to social and socio-technological trends that affect both media market transformations and journalistic performance itself.

Secondly, apart from the outlined global socio-technological determinants of increasing mistrust, there are some *local socio-economic* or *political determinants* in each national media system. These can weaken the sense of ontological security of the population and consequently also their trust in media and media journalists. In this perspective, three time-structured types of audience mistrust can be distinguished: a) *short-term*, which represents only a partial disruption of trust — it is related to individual scandals and journalists' failures, b) *middle-term*, which exceeds several-month intervals and can be triggered by journalistic practice partaking in some adverse social processes. However, the most dangerous, from the media point of view, is c) *long-term*, usually gradually increasing mistrust.

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It can be assumed that Czech media and Czech media journalists are being confronted with the type of chronic mistrust that has reached the third phase. There seems to be one more general cause: a growing distance between the media and their audiences, related to the fact that a substantial number of Czech journalists have sacrificed professional rules in order to support the new regime, to which they offered not only their careers but also their values. Nevertheless, their identification with the building of a pluralistic democracy was gradually confronted with the increasing discontentment of the majority of the population, critically reacting to broken promises of transformation. There was a delayed increase of mistrust on the part of media consumers who, in the first post-1989 decade, perceived journalists as being on their side in the hope of a better future. This hopeful trust was markedly disrupted by the economic crisis, and probably also by the growing phenomenon of fake news which has affected economically languishing news media. Although the concept of fake news is not new (see e.g., Gerber and Green, 2000; Bartels, 1993), it has been gaining more traction in recent times. The declining trust in mainstream media and journalism can be both its cause and its consequence (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017).

Thus, the significant decline of public trust in Czech journalists can have far-reaching socio-political consequences, as the disappointed audiences mistrustful of journalists may tend to be more susceptible to other sources lacking professional standards and principles of mainstream journalism. This poses an existential threat to democracy with informed citizenry as its essential element, since a confused, uninformed, misinformed, or disinformed populace is unable to make sound decisions.

The sinking trust of mainstream journalists in the Czech Republic is especially alarming in the context of a recent rise in the number of propaganda websites. It seems that a significant part of the Czech population prefers 'alternative news' sites over so-called mainstream media outlets. According to the public opinion poll by the Globsec Policy Institute (2016) conducted on the representative sample of the Czech adult population, 24% of respondents claimed to trust the 'alternative' media (e.g. ParlamentniListy.cz, AC24.cz, Prvnizpravy.cz, which according to the European Values Think Tank publish disinformation content) more than the 'traditional' media (e.g. Czech Television, Czech Radio, or the dailies Pravo or Hospodarske noviny). On the other hand, 59% of respondents claimed to trust the 'traditional' media more (and the remaining 17% answered 'do not know'). The lack of trust in the traditional media affects the Czech Republic more than other countries from the region: in Slovakia and Hungary, about 17% of respondents trust the so-called alternative media and around 70% trust the traditional media (Globsec Policy Institute, 2016).

CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this paper was to analyze the change of public trust in Czech journalists in the time span of twelve years, and to analytically describe the structure and main

characteristics of mistrustful audiences. As expected (Hypothesis 1), the level of public trust in journalists declined significantly between 2004 and 2016 (the percentage of a mistrustful public increased from 19% to 46%). This means that the Czech Republic as a central European country with a post-communist media model is no exception from the trend of a rising public mistrust in media and journalists present in the most developed Euro-American countries.

The decline represents a multi-dimensionally conditioned phenomenon which has its own global macro socio-technological causes, as well as local socio-political particularities. The data support hypothesis 2, that the mistrust decreases with the age of the respondents. In accordance with newer studies from various countries (e.g. Newman, Fletcher, Levy and Nielsen, 2016; Gallup, 2016), the analysis shows a strong mistrust with the youngest and middle generation. This reflects one of the attributes of the multi-factored structure of the public mistrust in Czech journalists. The local causes include mainly the strong left-wing nature of the mistrustful population which has grown younger in the last decade and whose formal education level has decreased.

Mistrustful audiences are characterized by the lower measure of media consumption (in accordance with hypothesis 3) and the left-wing political orientation (hypothesis 4). In line with hypothesis 5, the mistrust gets stronger with extreme political attitudes (extreme left/right wing). In this sense, Czech consumers behave in a manner similar to some of their foreign counterparts (Glynn & Huge, 2014; Lee, 2005; Lee, 2010).

It seems that the rather idealized image of the Czech journalist is being damaged by its professional identity split, which is determined by: a) global socio-technological trends dissolving the authoritative position of journalists as the authorized interpreters of social reality, who are being confronted with an ever-more manifold spectrum of defused amateur competitors, b) the growing distance between the media and their audiences, which is associated with a strong journalistic support of the new post-1989 regime. It appears that the value asymmetry between the left-wing part of population and the majority of Czech journalists who are partial to right-wing and liberal values begins to turn against the journalists in the form of markedly declared mistrust. This trend is especially apparent with the significant part of the left-wing audience, yet it is their form of reaction not only to the feeling their values are asymmetrically represented, but also to the unmet expectations and unfulfilled hopes that were terminated by the consequences of the economic crisis.

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A socio-demographic portrait of Central and Eastern European (CEE) journalists: A comparative analysis of the journalistic profession in eight CEE countries using the Worlds of Journalism Study

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ABSTRACT: This article analyzes the journalistic profession in eight Central and Eastern European countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Moldova, Romania, and Russia, using the quantitative findings of the Worlds of Journalism Study. The comparison refers to age, gender, education, positions, work experience, religion, and political views of journalists from these states. The study was conducted in each country by a national team responsible for the collected data. The national studies were carried out between 2012 and 2017. Over 3,000 journalists participated as respondents. For comparative analysis, the study builds on the national databases and the country reports written within the project by each national team.

KEYWORDS: journalism, Central and Eastern Europe, age, gender, education, positions, work experience, religion, political preferences.

INTRODUCTION

Country classifications by region and then by their joint performance in political and economic developments and systems thinking is not a new idea. More and more nations connected by various geopolitical, economic, historical, social, and cultural ties seek to ally in different regions to cope with international changes. The Central and Eastern European region is no exception. This region consists of more than twenty countries, which are also known as post-Communist/Soviet nations. After democratization, most countries desired to form an elitist region framed in a global system and to get rid of the post-Communist countries' label. However, it was far from successful. Therefore, this region, linked to an undeniable past, knew an internal break. The regional differences were so significant that some countries

decided to follow different paths, dismembering this region into two and more distinct and very different subregions. The new alliances were formed between the closer neighbors with political and economic performances who decide in common to dissociate from other neighbors that underperform in politics, governance, economy, media, and other sectors, compared to the regional average.

Recent studies about media systems and journalism (Bajomi-Lázár, 2015; Balčytiene et al, 2014; Örnebring, 2012) show clearly this type of rift which re-affirms the huge regional differences which makes it almost impossible to conduct a joint analysis. As Dobek-Ostrowska (2015, p. 36) states, "all 21 countries are situated in the same region of the continent but they differ significantly in the context of their historical background, political standards, economic development, and in consequence, in the media systems, which are products of all those elements". From this point of view, any comparison seems superfluous, especially at the conceptualization level, which nowadays has become a must in any research. A prerequisite for many comparative studies is to find common patterns that might form models and theories. More and more studies, which present two or three countries from the same region, claim to form a comparative model. Therefore, one of the most common mistakes in such research is that "many researchers compare other nations to their own countries by evaluating other cultures through the lens of their own cultural value-systems. If they then focus on differences between the units of analysis, they tend to understate heterogeneities within the examined cultures, ignoring the fact that, occasionally, variances within cultures may be greater than those across cultural boundaries" (Hanitzsch, 2009, p. 422). To overcome these traps of comparative studies, the only solution is contextualization, which better than any other theory, explain a phenomenon analyzed by comparison. However, contextualization is difficult to achieve especially in comparative studies where many countries are present (see Weaver & Willnat, 2012; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Hanitzsch, 2007; Hanitzsch et al., 2010).

Considering regional differences and research difficulties, there are few CEE studies that present media and journalism by comparison. I will present two of them which have served as an example in making the comparison in this article. The most recent is the regional focus analyses, created by Dobek-Ostrowska (2015), who analyzed extensively the media status quo in all Central and Eastern European countries. Perhaps, it is the only complete regional analysis on media which does not draw a parallel between Central and Eastern European and Western media that most studies are used to doing. Dobek-Ostrowska proposes four models of media in Central and Eastern Europe, relying on different criteria, indexes, and rankings of development of media, politics, economy, and other realms describing these countries. These four models of media are called the Hybrid Liberal, the Politicized Media, the Media in Transition, and the Authoritarian models. According to the author, the Hybrid Liberal model refers to West Slavonic and Baltic states, such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Their

media systems are based on the principles of profitability, which makes them politically untouchable, compared to the Politicized Media model countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, and Serbia) where "the media are politicized not only by political actors, but often by journalists and some media owners, who have clear political preferences" (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2015, p. 29). The other two models included very weak democracies with hybrid media systems and very low journalistic professionalism (the Media in Transition model) or highly politicized and with a strong political media propaganda (the Authoritarian model). Moldova, Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are part of the Media in Transition model, while Belarus and Russia represent the Authoritarian models.

The second study, that presents three models of media systems, was developed by Peruško, Vozab and Čuvalo (2013). Two categories of Central and Eastern European countries were included in a cluster analysis of media systems that described the similarities and differences of media structures and practices in different European countries. The authors placed Lithuania, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria in the same category as countries as Italy, Greece, and Spain and named them the South and East European model. Other Central and Eastern European nations as Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Slovakia, along with Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Great Britain, and Portugal formed the European mainstream model. The Eastern European and Western countries were compared in terms of the quality of public service television (role of the state), newspaper circulation per capita (media market), party influence (political and economic parallelism), owner influence (political and economic parallelism) and journalistic culture (professionalization of journalism) (Peruško, Vozab & Čuvalo, 2013, p. 148). The innovation of this approach comes from the fact that the analysis put the audience in the focus of comparisons, which has become a key factor in building new media structures in digital media systems. Although both studies are no longer relevant due to changing political, economic, and social and media contexts, their contribution to understanding this region is meaningful.

My article comes in support of this type of comparison, even though it may seem as a 'study findings' paper. I analyze the journalistic profession in eight Central and Eastern European countries, such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Moldova, Romania, and Russia using the quantitative results of the Worlds of Journalism Study.[1] The main lines of my comparison refer to age, gender, education, positions, work experience, religion, and political views of journalists from these states. The analysis refers to the recent changes that have occurred in the profession and in the working places of journalists from Central and Eastern Europe. I have not described the profession in each country nor each particular media or their political or economic systems. There are enough studies, including the ones mentioned above, which presented these types of data. Repeating existing

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[1] The project website: http://worldsofjournalism.org/.

information is superfluous. In this sense, I would like to mention that the descriptive statistics findings of this analysis will be underrepresented, although there are plenty of passages that refer to the study results. It is rather an analysis than a review of some findings of the journalistic profession in this region. The analysis should be read with some reluctance, because it does not refer to all states in the region, given the reduced number of them in this study.

METHODOLOGY

The Worlds of Journalism Study (2012–2017) relied on a common methodology adopted by each of the 67 countries participating in this research project. An extensive questionnaire with over 30 questions generated responses from more than 27,500 selected journalists. The questionnaire was conducted face to face, by phone, and online. The original questionnaire written in English was translated into the national languages and was conducted with a representative number of journalists from national, regional, and local offline and online media, who had been selected proportionally to the total number of registered journalists in each country. However, the results of this study cannot be generalized to the entire population of journalists in the analyzed countries, because only certain (the most important) media were part of the media samples. It is very important to mention that the methodological demands imposed on this project have minimized any discussion of the lack of reliability of the samples. If there were serious sampling errors, the results would be excluded from this study. For this reason, I consider the results presented below to be representative of the selected media.

For this research project the term "journalist" was defined 'classically' as media professionals, who select, write, edit, present, schedule, negotiate journalistic content, and participate in editorial coordination and management. He/she earns most of his/her income (at least 50%) from journalism. Moreover, he/she works in newsrooms of national, regional, or local newspapers, radio stations, television channels, online media, and news agencies. In this project only legally registered media institutions with newsrooms and news programs have been considered.

Regarding the questionnaire, it could include additional questions to those originally imposed. Every country had the freedom to identify both the surveyed media and the number of respondents. However, the sample size was not random. It respected the proportion rules initially identified in a field manual accepted by all project members. It must be mentioned that the sample unrepresentativeness was one of the criteria for rejection of some national findings. This study relied heavily on competent investigators and their good faith in drafting the countries' databases. Each of the 67 countries drafted a national database (in a required SPSS template) in which the respondents' answers were individually coded. It should be noted that this article does not claim to review a field of study such as the professional culture of journalists, nor to use meta-analysis as a quantitative analysis technique for the obtained findings.

Natalia Vasilendiuc

This article presents in a comparative manner the quantitative results of the Worlds of Journalists study without generalizing or creating common patterns. It would not only be a difficult but also impossible task because of obvious contextual differences.

For this article, I chose to present the comparative findings of research conducted in Central and Eastern Europe with the participation of over 3,000 journalists from tens of national, regional, and local media. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Moldova, Romania, and Russia were the eight countries analyzed in this paper. The questionnaires were conducted between 2012 and 2017. The oldest data are from Estonia (2012) and the most recent from Bulgaria, which completed the country research in January 2017. For comparative analysis, I have used the national databases and the country reports written within the project by each national team.[2] These data should be carefully analyzed and contextualized to the periods in which each team conducted the study.

This study started from some general research questions that attempted to assess and transform the existing notion of journalistic culture into a universal concept. The main question was whether journalistic cultures could be deconstructed in empirically measurable terms and if their functionality could be evaluated across cultural borders. The main goal of this research was "to map journalistic cultures onto a grid of common dimensions and explore their variation across nations, various types of news organizations and different professional milieus" (www.worldsofjournalisms.org). From this general approach, I chose for this article only the general characteristics (age, gender, education, position in the newsroom, work experience, religious and political views) relating to this profession in Central and Eastern Europe. My assumption was that contextual differences are so significant that it is almost impossible to outline a common socio-demographic portrait of the journalists in this region.

AGE, GENDER AND EDUCATION

Although a significant number of the total respondents were elderly people, the average age did not exceed 35–40 years. In Moldova and Romania, the average age of all journalists was no more than 30 years old, in comparison with Estonia where their average age was 40. This means that the profession is quite young and, as Table 1 shows, dominated by women.

Only in the Czech Republic and Hungary the number of women journalists was surpassed by men journalists. In other countries, the percentage of women outnumbered the men and the numerical difference between the two sexes increases with age. In comparison, Latvia had the highest percentage (72.4%) of women in newsrooms and the Czech Republic had the lowest number (43.3%) of women journalists. As some country reports argue, the age and gender differences occurred in the late 1980s

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[2] All country reports can be found under the following link: http://worldsofjournalism.org/103/.

and early 1990s, when "the generation gap caused by societal changes [the change of political regimes]" was recorded.[3] Until then, the profession was strongly dominated by men in their mid-forties with dozen of years of professional experience.

These changes indicate a greater or a lesser (depending on the country) de-professionalization of journalists. The increasing numbers of young, inexperienced journalists led to a transformation of the profession into a trade. Usually, the process must be reversed, a profession arises when any trade or occupation transforms, but in this case skills have become more important than knowledge. This is even more visible with the main technological challenges that all Central and Eastern European media markets faced in recent decades, which favored the emergence of "desk journalism", "google journalism" and "copy-paste journalism". Ethics in the profession became an option and not a norm, and malpractice cases are more frequent. The growing number of women journalists seems to be a change that significantly boosted the profession's development. However, their great number does not necessarily indicate their active participation in organizational leadership. Their presence in administrative staff has increased, but it seems more an exception than a rule. Only in Estonia and Latvia do women hold equal or more top executive positions. In other countries women occupied mostly the positions of reporter and news writer.

Table 1. Age and gender of journalists in selected CEE countries

Country	Age (years)		Female		Male	
	Youngest	Oldest	N	%	N	%
Bulgaria	21	66	170	64.6	93	35.4
The Czech Republic	20	71	126	43.3	165	56.7
Estonia	19	71	160	58.4	114	41.6
Hungary	20	65	181	47.5	200	52.5
Latvia	20	67	246	72.4	94	27.6
Moldova	20	65	134	60.6	87	39.4
Romania	19	77	213	62.5	128	37.5
Russia	18	75	248	64.6	136	35.4

Source: Data retrieved from the Worlds of Journalism Study.

According to this study, most journalists held a bachelor's and master's degree. The most highly-educated journalists were from Bulgaria, Russia, and Estonia. Compared to other countries, over 50% of them (in the case of Bulgaria — 71%) completed a master's degree and a significant number had doctoral studies (Table 2). For example, 9% of the total of 390 Russian respondents finished a Ph.D. The

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[3] Němcová Tejkalová and Láb (2016). *Journalists in the Czech Republic*. Report retrieved January 31, 2017 from https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29704/1/Country_report_Czech_Republic.pdf.

number of those who studied journalism and communication is also very high. The percentage varies (from 80% in Romania to 53% in Croatia), but most of them had a solid educational background in these fields.

Table 2. Education level of journalists in selected CEE countries

Country	Not completed high school		Completed high school		College/B.A. degree		M.A. degree		Doctorate		Some university studies; no degree	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bulgaria	0	0.0	2	0.8	54	20.5	187	71.1	13	4.9	7	2.7
The Czech Republic	0	0.0	69	24.0	66	22.9	119	41.3	10	3.5	24	8.3
Estonia	1	0.4	21	7.7	74	27.1	148	54.2	1	0.4	28	10.3
Hungary	3	0.9	60	17.5	181	52.8	67	19.5	8	2.3	24	7.0
Latvia	3	0.9	14	4.2	138	41.2	127	37.9	4	1.2	49	14.6
Moldova	5	2.3	20	9.0	121	54.8	58	26.2	1	0.5	16	7.2
Romania	2	0.6	64	18.8	142	41.6	91	26.7	8	2.3	34	10.0
Russia	3	0.8	4	1.0	62	15.9	223	57.2	36	9.2	62	15.9

Source: Data retrieved from the Worlds of Journalism Study.

The high number of university degrees in journalism is spectacular when compared to the first years these countries began their transition toward a process of democratization. The social realm changes had major effects on journalism education that had managed to promote Western ways of practicing journalism. The impact of these changes are currently visible throughout almost all the countries. In the last five years, a large majority of journalists still considered Western rules of practicing journalism as reference points that affected their work.

WORK POSITION AND EXPERIENCE

The democratization processes led to changes in the media market and to a significant restructuring of newsrooms in each investigated country. The old editorial management systems no longer worked for national media organizations. However, it should be noted that the transformation of old newsrooms into new more dynamic, adaptable, influenced by media market demands management structures was not exclusively conditioned by socio-political changes in these countries, but

also by opportunities offered by the online environment. For some CEE countries, the transition to online went more slowly than in others. This fact was visible in the pilot study of the Worlds of Journalism project developed between 2007 and 2011 in comparison with current research. For example, in 2007, most Romanian newsrooms were organized classically (with hierarchies, different level of responsibilities, specialized departments, etc.) and, at that moment, to find five journalists (the study's required standard) from each sampled newsroom posed no difficulty. In the current study, I keep referring to the situation of the Romanian sample, as there were quite a few situations (especially in some regional and local media) in which there were very few journalists with work contracts. Many newsrooms preferred trainees or contributors (who in some cases cannot be categorized as journalists) because they are cheaper. In addition, some specializations, very popular in the past, disappeared from the editorial organization chart. Referring to the results of this study, Table 3 shows a distribution of journalistic positions in newsrooms of eight CEE investigated countries. Thus, it can noticed that in Hungarian and Romanian newsrooms were found many trainees, which far exceeded the average of other countries. At the opposite end is Latvia, where their number was zero. Moreover, the desk head position has become increasingly unpopular. Its coordinating activities have been transshipped to other positions, such as senior editors/editors and — in some cases — even to reporters.

Table 3. Work position of journalists in selected CEE countries (% of respondents)

Country	Editor-in-chief	Managing editor	Desk head /assignment editor	Department head	Senior editor	Producer	Reporter	News writer	Trainee	Other
Bulgaria	15.2	4.9	6.8	5.3	23.6	2.7	26.2	4.2	0.8	10.3
The Czech Republic	12.0	7.2	7.2	9.6	5.5	0.7	38.8	12.7	1.0	5.2
Estonia	14.6	7.3	0.0	4.0	10.2	2.9	22.3	35.4	0.4	2.9
Hungary	9.0	3.9	6.2	3.4	5.2	11.9	13.7	20.1	18.6	8.2
Latvia	11.2	8.8	1.8	12.9	4.4	3.5	8.5	36.8	0.0	12.1
Moldova	4.1	11.8	3.2	4.1	5.0	1.4	41.6	7.7	5.0	16.3
Romania	9.7	12.6	3.8	1.2	11.7	5.3	41.1	2.1	11.7	0.9
Russia	11.8	12.1	3.8	10.3	6.9	6.4	34.4	9.0	2.3	3.1

Source: Data retrieved from the Worlds of Journalism Study.

The professional experience of interviewed journalists shows that they did not plan their careers around a prospective retirement age, spending only a limited period of time in this profession and alternating this activity with other additional short-term opportunities. In Romania, Moldova, and Hungary an average career length did not exceed 10 years, only in Bulgaria was the average 19 years (Table 4). However, there were a limited number of people (only a few dozen in the sample of 3,000 respondents from this study) who into entered retirement from this job. They represented the old generation of journalists who have managed to reform themselves at the same time with the media system and to adapt to new working practices. Many of them hold administrative positions in newsrooms. In contrast, after graduation, some young journalists do not like to pursue a career in this field. They use their short-term practice in journalism to reconvert to other activities, usually tangential to this profession, which are more conducive to later retirement. Among their preferences are PR, advertising, communication activities in various public and private companies or even politics. There are many cases when top-level journalists have become politicians.

Table 4. Years of professional experience in journalism in selected CEE countries

Country	Mean (years)
Bulgaria	19
The Czech Republic	11
Estonia	14
Hungary	9
Latvia	16
Moldova	8
Romania	8
Russia	11

Source: Data retrieved from the Worlds of Journalism Study.

RELIGION AND POLITICAL VIEWS

The political and religious preferences are a sensitive subject for this profession. In theory, journalistic objectivity should not be affected by preferences of any kind, but in practice everything is country-oriented. As I argued in an article about religious influences in journalism "in the secular countries the journalists' discourse is more oriented towards the non-religious overview rather than in theocratic countries where journalists have promoted a very morality-centered speech" (Vasilendiuc, 2012, p. 183). In our case, all nine countries are Christian nations with moderate religious positions and values. The religious representations of their journalists

depend on the social role of the Church and their religious leaders in each country. Certainly, these representations change over time and could also change the media image and the public trust in this institution. At least in recent years, during this study, the journalists showed a moderate interest towards this subject. A significant number of respondents, mainly from Russia and Moldova considered religion 'extremely' and 'very important' for them (Table 5). In contrast, Latvia and the Czech Republic were on the opposite side with a large percentage of irreligious, nonreligious, a-religious or even anti-religious journalists. This data can be correlated with the journalists' answers to the question about their trust in various social and political institutions and organizations.[4] Summarizing, the religious leaders occupied the lowest positions of trust throughout countries. However, Czech journalists showed the greatest degree of mistrust of religious leaders, compared to Moldova, for example, where the degree of confidence is higher.

Table 5. Importance of religion as seen by journalists in selected CEE countries

Country	Extremely important		Very important		Somewhat important		Little important		Unimportant	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bulgaria	20	7.6	31	11.8	91	34.6	60	22.8	61	23.2
The Czech Republic	11	4.1	21	7.7	49	18.1	83	30.6	107	39.5
Estonia[5]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hungary	34	10.9	17	5.5	89	28.6	108	34.7	63	20.3
Latvia	18	6.0	25	8.3	49	16.2	91	30.1	119	39.4
Moldova	26	11.8	40	18.2	56	25.5	52	23.6	46	20.9
Romania	23	6.8	45	13.3	97	28.6	78	23.0	96	28.3
Russia	45	11.5	71	18.2	101	25.9	81	20.8	92	23.6

Source: Data retrieved from the Worlds of Journalism Study.

The number of specialized journalists decreases with each year because of the development of new media technology and practices. Under the new circumstances, multitasking became a must-have that contributed to the blurring of the boundaries of specialized journalism. Journalists move from one platform to another and from one field to another without the necessary expertise and education. Consequently, throughout their career journalists arrive to address almost all topics, and politics is no exception. In this study, the sampled journalists were more generalists rather than specialized (see the previous section) and politics was among their usual subjects to address. Their political preferences (as shown in Table 6) were closer to

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[4] See the chapter "Journalistic Trust" from the country reports.
[5] Missing data.

the center than leans to the right or the left of the political spectrum. This kind of unclarity in political options came over time because of the confusion of political parties in defining their ideology. However, in some cases (of deeply instrumentalized media systems, such as Moldova) journalists are involved in political polarization of society and often represent the bullhorn of various outside actors. Despite the ethical rules that force them to be balanced (most countries have at least one journalist code of ethics), these journalists support or oppose some political ideas imposed on them by their personal and working environments.

Table 6. Political preferences of journalists in selected CEE countries

Country	Left (%)				Center (%)	Right (%)				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Bulgaria	8.3	1.2	2.4	10.6	24.0	9.4	13.8	14.2	5.1	11.0
The Czech Republic	2.4	1.2	2.0	11.4	29.4	14.9	19.6	11.0	3.9	4.3
Estonia	0.0	3.0	7.9	16.8	18.8	14.4	20.8	10.4	5.9	2.0
Hungary	4.3	4.3	9.4	14.4	30.9	8.6	10.8	8.6	2.2	6.5
Latvia	2.6	0.0	3.6	11.8	39.7	11.5	14.8	10.8	3.3	2.0
Moldova	1.7	1.1	2.8	5.1	36.0	8.4	15.7	14.6	5.1	9.6
Romania	0.9	0.6	6.9	6.6	31.3	15.9	13.1	14.4	5.3	5.0
Russia	1.5	2.8	15.2	12.1	46.1	9.0	8.5	2.1	1.3	1.3

Question: In political matters, people talk of "the left", "the right", and the "center". On a scale where 0 is left, 10 is right, and 5 is center, where would you place yourself? Source: Data retrieved from the Worlds of Journalism Study.

However, the religious and political preferences of journalists in some countries should be analyzed contextually. Supporting ideas of unbiased, objective, and apolitical thinking is untenable in some countries, especially where considerable political abuses occur. Writing objectively about certain events is almost impossible, given the number of cases in which certain societal systems do not work.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on these quite limited data, describing the profession of journalist in terms of black and white (important-unimportant, left-right, trust-mistrust etc.), one can still identify certain common peculiarities which can form a region overview. This study was based on the principles of the Western journalism model, which, although adopted in theory by all these countries, is basically more or less practiced. Even though most investigated countries accepted, at least at a discursive level, in this model a few outliers can be find among them, like Moldova or Russia. Their professional model is different from the post-communist sampled EU

member states; although in theory it seems fairly suitable. Most likely, the difference between them is caused by an imbalanced relationship between media and politics, far different from what happens in EU states. In both countries, although so different in many ways, political polarization became an openly practiced editorial policy. Political instrumentalization is a common practice also in other states (such as Romania or Hungary), but their influence is to some extent limited by EU media policies, in consequence any direct form of instrumentalization is viewed as an attack on the rule of law. In the case of Moldova and Russia, the political actors form the rule of law by themselves. Thus, having almost the same start time in developing democracy, these eight investigated nations have journeyed differently. The media and journalism development in these countries depended exclusively on their social-political route. Considering these contextual differences about two different categories of countries in the same region, I would propose studying the journalistic profession at the international/global level exclusively through qualitative methods to avoid inappropriate generalizations.

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An integrated model for public service media governance based on participatory governance and actor-centered institutionalism: Initial application to the independence of the Polish public broadcaster TVP S.A.*

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ABSTRACT: The aim of the article is to introduce a governance analysis model which can be used for the investigation of public service media (PSM) change processes. With its help it is possible to explore to what extent the PSM system is dependent on political as well as economic influences in a timeline. The PSM governance model derives from the theoretical framework of the actor-centered institutionalism (ACI) and the participatory media governance approach. Participatory media governance allows civil society members to be included in the investigation. With the help of ACI and the agent-structure dynamics model one can analyze three different spheres of actor's actions which can be observed empirically: sub-systemic orientation horizons, institutional arrangements and the actor's constellations. Based on these preliminary considerations, the model is applied to PSM governance in Poland since the socio-political transition of 1989 until 2016.

KEYWORDS: participatory media governance, actor-centered institutionalism, public service media (PSM), civil society, transformation, Telewizja Polska S.A.

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INTRODUCTION

The transformation of a media system, broadcasting in particular, is considered to be successful when it independently follows its own logical function. A democratic model of mass communication is ideally based on two structural principles: diversity and freedom (Article 11, Paragraph 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU; Dahl, 1989, p. 220; McQuail, 1992, p. 29). Whereby "the characteristic freedom depends mainly on structures ensuring the political independence of the media"

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* The paper presented here provided in a similar form a contribution to the RIPE conference in Antwerp and Brussels, Belgium on September 22–24, 2016.

(Voltmer, 2000, p. 126). In February 2012, in their Declaration on public service media (PSM) and the related recommendation, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe defined the primary mission of PSM and declared: "public service media must remain independent from political or economic interference and achieve high editorial standards of impartiality, objectivity and fairness".[1] Based on this Declaration, in 2015 the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) also outlined the fundamental principles for PSM governance in its "Legal Focus". In addition to secure and appropriate funding, the EBU Core Values of public service media include independence, accountability, transparency and sustainability (Wagner & Berg, 2015). In particular, the analysis of the project presented here concentrates on the above-mentioned core requirement which postulates that PSM must remain independent of political or economic interference.

Unfortunately a lot of public service media in Europe wrestle with a lack of funding and increasing commercialization. Furthermore, in the former communist-ruled states, an over-politicization can be often observed. For example, at the beginning of January 2016 the new Polish government introduced so-called small media legislation which allows the Minister of State Treasury to directly appoint and dismiss all members of the supervisory and management boards of TVP and PR (Polish Radio) without the approval or consultation of the broadcasting authority and constitutional institution — The National Broadcasting Council (Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji, KRRiT) and without any public debate of all relevant stakeholders.[2] In February 2016, delegates from the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ), the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF) and the International Press Institute (IPI) assessed the current situation of PSM in Poland. The group interviewed journalists, lawyers, and civil society activists, including representatives of Poland's leading journalist associations. The delegation made recommendations relating to the development of standards concerning ethics, independence from government interference and press freedom, and concluded: "We recognize that Poland's public broadcaster has for many years been seen as a political pawn and a prize for the governing party".[3]

To assess how this current critical situation within Polish PSM governance arose, an analysis model is used. Reflections on governance models in the area of interest are still required, and the Council of Europe "is interested in examining the matter because it is a crucial matter for the future of PSM" (Council of Europe, 2009, p. 3). Thus, the main aim of this article is to introduce a PSM governance model which is based on the theoretical considerations of the actor-centered institutionalism (ACI), the agent-structure

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[1] Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)1 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on public service media governance. Retrieved February 15 and August 26, 2016 from https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1908265 and Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on public service media governance https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1908241.

[2] This legal amendment is the first step in a forthcoming major media reform in Poland, which is to replace the 1992 Broadcasting Act.

[3] EFJ-ECPMF-IPI urge the Polish government to guarantee public broadcasting independence. Retrieved February, 1 and August, 30, 2016 from http://europeanjournalists.org/blog/2016/02/01/efj-ecpmf-ipi-urge-the-polish-government-to-guarantee-public-broadcasting-independence/.

dynamics model of the well-known German sociologist Schimank (2007, p. 223), and the participatory media governance approach. The model presents media regulation in the form of a triangle of political, economic and public objectives, in which is the assumption from a normative perspective that public service media maintains egual relations with all relevant environments. Excessively close ties between PSM and one of these environments would affect its performance. A central proposal against the politicization of PSM and their strengthening presented here is the consistent involvement in broadcasting regulation of socially relevant actors. Consequently, this project will not only examine the disproportionate politicization and the excessive intervention of the media industry in the internal PSM business, but it will also analyze a further influencing factor of socially relevant stakeholders. Many scientists from various socio-political areas complain about the current national regulatory crisis and demand a stronger and deeper democracy (Barber, 2004; Crouch, 2008; Fung & Wright, 2001; Norris, 2012). Parallel to these general demands, scientists and practitioners in the media field (Carpentier, 2011, 2016; Dahlgren, 2003) as well as within PSM governance in particular, claim to be able to counteract this regulatory crisis by involving civil society in the regulatory process (Jakubowicz, 2008; Lowe, 2010; Syvertsen, 2004). This sentiment is echoed in the EBU Legal Focus, which states that "the risk of over-politicization may indeed be lower in alternative systems where a majority or large parts of the membership are nominated by various groups of society" (Wagner & Berg, 2015, p. 14).

PARTICIPATORY PSM GOVERNANCE

When it comes to analyzing media policy and regulation, researchers can no longer avoid the concept of governance. Originally, the term comes from the field of institutional economics and has enjoyed uninterrupted popularity for about 20 years in many different debates and in different disciplines (Grote & Gbikpi, 2002; Kooiman, 2003; Mayntz, 2004; Rhodes, 1996). Unfortunately, the term therefore does not always have the same meaning, preventing any standard textbook definition. The situation is similar for the term participation, which will here be combined with the term governance. Here, too, different definitions are used by researchers and practitioners. Initially, it is therefore necessary to define the way in which participatory governance is used.

The general characteristics of governance phenomena include the observation that the laws and regulations made by the state represent only one possible form of political regulation of social relationships. Increasingly, in addition to classical hierarchical state regulation, very complex structures appear in the form of economic networks, as non-governmental organizations are involved in policy-and decision-making processes at the level of nation states themselves, as well as at the EU level or even at a global level. In this respect, many scholars of various disciplines declare that the state as the center is no longer in a position to regulate the complex structures, which have various networks of private and civil society actors (Bevir, 2011; Kooiman, 2003; Mayntz, 2009). Furthermore, others have stated that the pure hierarchical form

of government (governance by government) is declining, and even that the state is disintegrating (Beisheim & Schuppert, 2007).

Thus there emerges a common core of the governance approach which can be characterized by the following broadly defined definition, whereby the state is not replaced by the new players on the scene, but instead has a managerial function (although it is only one actor among many). Governance is accordingly described as: "the totality of existing forms of intentional collective regulation of societal matters in a state" (Mayntz, 2004), or, alternatively, in an analytical perspective as "collective actions and decisions in complex institutional structures (…) to cope with interdependencies" (Benz & Dose, 2010, p. 253). Investigations based on the concept of governance usually focus on the link between policy-making and the media industries, thus primarily focusing on political and economic actors.

Participatory governance, as the horizontal extension of governance (Puppis, 2007), an extension from political stakeholders to private/civil actors, has so far only been given sporadic attention by debates on governance (Walk, 2011, p. 131). The importance of civil society involvement for media governance can be explained through special characteristics which are attributed to civil society. "Through its acute sensitivity to problems, capability for discourse and orientation to the common good, it can be seen as a particularly qualified actor where the central infrastructure of democratic societies is involved" (Eilders, 2011, p. 176).

Through the participatory variant of governance, other governance strands which are "based more around empowering the people as consumers, rather than as democratic citizens" have been criticized (McLaverty, 2011). The democratic theory underpins the participatory governance approach, as it is based on the idea that a functioning democracy requires active citizen involvement (Barber, 2004; Geissel, 2012; Pateman, 1970). Thus, participatory governance is related to one of the classical strands of democratic theory: the participatory theory of democracy, which has the longest tradition. This emphasizes the strong role of the antique "demos", which refers to people who decide directly themselves about issues which affect them. Furthermore, can Rousseau's political philosophy be noted with the famous claim: "All State power emanates from the people" which is considered as a fundamental democratic principle.

The participatory theory experienced several revivals, where representative democracy was denounced as being deficient, and the call for stronger involvement of the people themselves in the formation of political will and the decision-making processes became louder. In this spirit, Almond and Verba with their "civic culture" study proclaimed the start of the participatory revolution in 1963. Here the concept of participation stands in direct relation to the concept of civil society. The willingness for political participation is a basic requirement of civil society, whereby civil society is understood to be "a political sphere whose actors address their wishes for self-determination and democratization to the political institutions" and "not to restrict policy-making to state actors" (Klein & Rohde, 2003, pp. 1–2). The reformist civic movements of the "Velvet Revolution" of the 1980's in Eastern Europe were based on

the concept of civil society (Arato, 1981; Jakubowicz, 1996; Michnik, 1985; Smolar, 1996). Finally, since the 1992 Rio summit on Environment and Development, some fifty thousand activists participated in summit proceedings, whereby civil society discourse experienced a new revival in both scientific and political discussion.

Similarly, media scientists claim that "media governance has been one of the most influential notions in the field of media and communication policy in recent years" (Karppinen & Moe, 2013). Moreover, although communication science recognizes the civil society and participatory potential (Carpentier, 2016; Dahlgren, 2003) there has hardly been any theoretical integration of the participatory strand in the media governance concept. Firstly, this may be due to the fact that democratic theory questions are assigned to the "inherently normative approach" (Puppis, 2010b, p. 136) of governance, so-called good governance which was firstly put forward by the World Bank in the 1980's. Secondly, several authors deny civil society, as the only audience, its active actor status (Puppis, 2010a, p. 203). In this way, participation is not taken into account, especially in the analytical approaches.

The situation is different in the areas of PSM governance, where leading names have, for years, been trying to reflect the relationship between PSM and its public (Jakubowicz, 2008; Lowe, 2010). With the dissolution of the monopoly for public service broadcasting (PSB) came an interest in definitions and definition typologies for this relationship. Above all, the Scandinavian media scientists Syvertsen and Søndergaard stood out with their idea of defining the PSB as "the relationship to society" and as "broadcasting in the service of the audience" (Søndergaard, 1999; Syvertsen, 1999).

As early as 2009 the Media and Information Society Division Council of Europe used a broader definition of governance and cited the UN Economic and Societal Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP): "an analysis of governance focuses on the formal and informal actors involved in decision-making and implementing the decisions made and the formal and informal structures". In addition, the Council of Europe spoke of "the democratic participation of the public" and looked for possible new future governance models on the grounds that "in order to survive and maintain their crucial role in modern societies, PSM have no other solution than to get closer to the public" (Council of Europe, 2009). With reference to PSM governance the EBU also mentioned in the Legal Focus: "A modern approach to governance also covers the way the legal framework is implemented in practice, how the actors behave within the framework and the relationship with external stakeholders: audiences, public authorities, economic players and civil society" (EBU, 2015). In addition, the EBU initiated measures through its project VISION2020 for producing a set of indicators and a mythology to assess and report on PSM's contribution to society (EBU, 2014).

However, the increasing participation of non-governmental and non-democratically legitimized actors involved in setting and enforcing binding rules has met with criticism from a considerable number of scholars. Thus, Benz and Papadopoulos ask: "To what extent are the new patterns of network and multi-level governance compatible with democratic standards?" (Benz & Papadopoulos, 2006, preface). Offe (2009,

p. 556) argues similarly: "Such an arrangement for the nation-state would, however, have to do without any evident connection to democratic legislation as the source of 'binding decisions', nor would it allow for the legal regulation and review of procedures and outcomes. It much more resembles the political-institutional formation that Colin Crouch has described as 'post-democracy' under which economic actors enjoy the license to do as they please". Others point beyond the problem of a lack of legitimacy to problems of selectivity of innovative forms of governance: "Efficient regulation is not synonymous with democratic accountability" (Newman, 2000). Finally the Polish sociologist Załęski (2012, p. 251) goes so far as to say: "Civil society is a neoliberal ideology legitimizing an attack of economic elites on institutions of the welfare state through development of the third sector as its substitute". Exactly both of the main criticisms outlined above, selectivity and lack of legitimation of civil society actors are taken into consideration when analyzing each of their respective impacts on PSM governance. This takes place among others with the aid of the actor-centered institutionalism approach.

PSM PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE LINKED TO ACTOR-CENTERED INSTITUTIONALISM (ACI)

To examine the degree of influence the various social actors from the fields of politics, economics and civil society have on PSM governance, a theoretical framework based on the participatory governance perspective combined with actor-centered institutionalism (ACI) is utilized. The governance perspective itself does not offer analytical instruments for the research of theoretical governance issues, but it is known for its high compatibility with other theories. "If communication scholars are able to look beyond governance as a label for new forms of regulation and to embrace it as an analytical concept, they can truly benefit from this integrated and theoretically open view on rules" according to Manuel Puppis (2010b, p. 145). Similarly, Patrick Donges (2007) tries to link the media governance approach with new sociological institutionalism (NSI). Both authors explain their decision for NSI to the characteristic of "rules", which, for example, affect "the connection between media organizations and the state or political actors, or the perception about which regulatory decisions are legitimate and which are not" (Donges, 2007, p. 328). Both of them also refer to Scott's work by defining institutions as: "symbolic and behavioral systems containing representational, constitutive and normative rules together with regulatory mechanisms that define a common meaning system and give rise to distinctive actors and action routines" (Scott, 2001, p. 48).

The actor-centered institutionalism presented below is also suitable for linking with the analytical concept of governance. This approach, similar to governance, is "closely connected with an institutional way of thinking"[4] (Puppis, 2010b, p. 143).

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[4] In her governance and steering approach comparison, Mayntz (2004) emphasized that governance approach deals with regulatory structures and is institutionalized, while the political steering approach is actor-centered.

However, the role of the relevant actors is not marginalized. In particular, when investigating the society's base in all its facets, the analysis of the relevant stakeholders with a micro perspective is indispensable. In addition, an important analytical strand of civil society research advocates an actor-centered perspective (Zimmer, 2012).

The ACI was developed at the end of the 1980's by Scharpf and Mayntz at the Max Planck Institute of Social Research (the so-called Cologne School of Governance) in response to the internationally held theoretical debate on institutions, the so-called "Renaissance of Institutionalism" (Luthard, 1999, p. 160). Against the background of progressive processes of social differentiation, the aim was to overcome the classical doctrine of the separation of state and society. This stated that only the state, as the political control center, is accorded steering capability and all other social associations and organizations are merely objects to be steered. There then began a new understanding of politics and society, whereby this approach can be regarded as the precursor of the current governance debate. "Society no longer appears to be a basically or tendentially 'unpolitical' institution, but a political form which has significant independent potential to deal with particular circumstances and parts thereof" (Luthard, 1999, p. 160). The term steering was replaced by concepts such as "new stateliness" or "new forms of government". In the words of Mayntz: "Formulations to which the eggshells of the traditional (continental European) concept of state still clearly adhere" (Mayntz, 2004).

Based on the ACI, the German social scientist Schimank (also a former scientist in Cologne) developed an agent structure dynamics model. It connects the actor-action perspective to the systems-structure perspective. By "the acting interaction" of actors, three societally observable dimensions of patterns are composed: the sub-systemic orientation horizons, the institutional arrangements and the actors'


Figure 1. Agent Structure Dynamics Model
    Source: Schimank (2007, p. 223).

constellations. With the help of this model, complex relationships of political, economic as well as civil society power structures can be analyzed. It is open to the action theories, and in the center of its approach stand the actors. In addition, with the aid of ACI, it is possible to present the numerous interdependencies of PSM to other social sub-systems, which is shown in the model below.

PSM GOVERNANCE ANALYSIS MODEL

For the study of the steering crisis, which has been evident within the Western as well within the Eastern European PSM governance, a model has been used that integrates public service media into the network of the neighboring social systems: politics, the economy, and society. A group of media scientists from the University of Zurich introduced the initial model together with the Hans Bredow Institute at the University of Hamburg (Jarren & Donges, 2005, p. 183; Jarren et al., 2001, p. 62). This model was based on the concept of the relationship with society, which was primarily put forward by the Scandinavian media scientists Syvertsen (1999) and Søndergaard (1999). At the same time, similar considerations came from Hamelink and Nordenstreng, who "borrowed" their triangle model from the social scientist Galtung (1999) did not relate it explicitly to PSM but to media in general (Hamelink & Nordenstreng, 2007, p. 226). The model helps integrate the relevant social groups into the regulation of public service media. Consequently, if no new actors are institutionalized "to represent the public's interest (…), the latter will only enter indirectly into the broadcasting system. Consequences of inadequate or unbalanced links between the Public Service and society are either an alienation or a disproportionate influence of particular social groups" (Puppis, 2010a, pp. 203–204).


Figure 2. Public service media as a relationship network

Source: Jarren and Donges (2005, p. 183).

There is the normative specification, in which the equilibrium of forces of three factors is indispensable for the effectiveness and legitimacy of PSM. It is important from a normative perspective that public service media maintains equal relations

to all relevant environments, because excessively close ties between PSM and one of these environments would affect its performance.

With this basic idea of placing PSM in the relationship network, the considerations regarding its independence are inseparably linked. Many scientists have already examined the question of media independence (Karppinen & Moe, 2016; Klimkiewicz, 2015; Wagner & Berg, 2015). Ultimately, a general definition is as follows: "independence refers to an absence of external control. Here independence means freedom from the influence of others, but also describes the capacity of an individual or institution to make decisions and act according to its own logic" (Karppinen & Moe, 2016, p. 106). In the essay "Secure autonomy, increase openness — securing the Public Service" Donges similarly distinguishes between negatively and the positively defined freedom. While negative freedom means the independence of public broadcasting from state actors or interventions of the economy, in the case of positive freedom, the autonomy of the broadcasting action system is emphasized (Donges, 2003).

If one imposes the basic theoretical ideas of Schimank's agent structure dynamics model onto the PSM relationship network, this explains the complex actions of actors both in one and several social systems. The ACI perspective allows one to speak of a functional broadcasting sub-system or a PSM system which is understood to be "a society-wide institutionalized, function-specific action context, which is characterized by a special sense" (Mayntz, 1988, pp. 17–18). For PSM, this sense could be understood as the remit or public value. Patrick Donges transfers the agent structure dynamics model to broadcasting. This results in a model that takes into account the network relationship of broadcasting as a functional sub-system to its environments, politics, the economy, and society and which can be utilized as an analytical model for media governance research. However, Donges does not regard the society component as sufficiently institutionalized and maintains that society is not a player which is component to act (Donges, 2002, p. 123). Here, the basic ideas of participatory governance come into play.

Donges describes broadcasting as a sub-system of system journalism. PSM is not regarded as an independent system, but merely as a specific orientation of the broadcasting system. In contrast, the analysis presented here examines PSM as a sub-system of the broadcasting system. The general sense of the broadcasting system is journalism (Donges, 2002, p. 113), where for PSM the sense can be defined as the PSM remit and public value. Because the sub-systems' limits in terms of actor-theoretical differentiation are permeable, it follows that the action orientations of adjacent sub-systems coexist in a subsystem. Accordingly, for the PSM sub-system, it can be assumed that the orientations of politics, the economy and society cross over the systemic limits of PSM. The question to be empirically answered here is what proportion of the "foreign" orientation horizons exists at the level of PSM actors.

On the one hand, preserving autonomy in this context means that one's own sub-systemic sense must not be overshadowed by the action orientations of other systems or, in relation to broadcasting, "that journalism gains dominance over other

action orientations through the process of functional differentiation, but not that these are completely eliminated" (Donges, 2002, p. 115). On the other hand, broadcasting would not be "autonomous" if it asserted its journalist action orientation 100% and reduced other system logics to nothing. Rather, it would be a case of one's own orientation, journalism, gaining dominance over other action orientations by means of a process of functional differentiation. Autonomy would therefore mean


Figure 3. PSM Governance Analysis Model

Source: Adapted from Schimank (2007, p. 223) and Donges (2002, p. 130).

"a hypothetical endpoint of the process of functional differentiation" (Donges, 2002, p. 115). Bennett (2014, p. 2) comments similarly on the great importance of the issue media independence, which "functions as a utopian vision of the media's role in society for those who regulate it, own it, work within it and even study it". Finally, the PSM governance analysis model, which is shown in Figure 3, emerged.

POTENTIAL APPLICATION AND POSSIBLE RESEARCH FINDINGS

In order to analyze PSM's political and economic dependence, this chapter will use the governance of the Polish public service broadcaster Telewizja Polska S.A. (TVP S.A.) as a case study. As a state corporation, TVP is the only public provider in Poland. Since it was founded in 1989, it has been regarded as "the regional leader" within the Central and Eastern European region, according to its distribution (more than 90%) and the TV broadcasting market.[5] Its information and news programs are the most popular and are the main source of information acquired through television.[6]

Nevertheless, since the beginning of its establishment in 1989, or officially in 1992, PSM in Poland has been treated as a political catch or extended arm of the party which could unite the most votes in Parliament. Political (state) influence was reflected in the protracted negotiation of broadcasting laws — also called media war — in the assignment of positions in the regulatory authority KRRiT and in the supervisory as well as management boards of public radio and television based on political calculations (political parallelism). Thus the current strong state dependence is a result of the former Polish governments' failure to establish an independent public service media which would be free of disproportionately strong influence by political parties (Głowacki & Urbaniak, 2011; Jakubowicz, 2013; Stępka, 2010) and would be securely financed.[7] Bajomi-Lázár describes PSM governance in Poland as a complex affair: "The political system in post-communist Poland has been described as one dominated by a 'culture based on clientelism and personalized relations', including 'the idea of colonizing posts in the public media', to the extent that the 'nomenklatura of a single Communist Party was replaced by a multi-party nomenklatura'" (Bajomi-Lázár, 2015, p. 74) and "the state (…) has become a hostage of various groups and interest trying to dominate its institutions" (Bajomi-Lázár, 2015, p. 75).

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[5] The results of the measurement of the audience market can be seen in the information from Nielsen Audience Measurement. Retrieved August 26, 2016, from: http://www.agbnielsen.pl/2016-07-31,2183.html.

[6] According to recent polls, TVP's information programs: "Wiadomości" and "Teleexpress" are watched by 24% of the population. Retrieved August 17 and 26, 2016 from http://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/artykul/wiadomosci-teleexpress-i-fakty-to-glowne-zrodla-informacyjne-polakow.

[7] Retrieved December 11, 2009 and August 30, 2016, from http://www.edn.dk/en/news/news-story/browse/31/article/ebu-calls-for-stable-funding-for-polish-public-service-media/?tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=139&cHash=47fd8eb1de7119af1a7e3a846bf07631.

To analyze the forces influencing Polish PSM governance, the above introduced network model has been applied. The three constituent elements of PSM as sub-system of broadcasting are: sub-systemic orientation horizons, the institutional arrangements and the actors' constellations. All three elements act together in empirically observable action, so that this creates study categories. Furthermore, relationships to neighboring social systems exist, which exert considerable influence on PSM governance. Based on the model, this study examines the question whether the political and the economic impact on the PSM have changed within the study period (1989–2016). Moreover, the study intends to determine how large are the influences of TVP regulators themselves and alternative forms of governance. Special attention is paid to the opposing forces and groups of intellectuals in the arts and sciences; these groups are repeatedly being set up in the country of the trade union "Solidarity". For instance, Hess (2015, pp. 226–227) sees the development of think tanks in Poland as a response to the democratization of society: "They are the manifestation of a reaction to the ongoing tendency of change in the sphere of public life and democracy". Accordingly, this chapter will examine the actual or intended influence of think tanks, foundations, associations, trade unions, and civil movements on the PSM governance of Telewizja Polska S.A. However, this study does not blindly follow the thesis that claims the involvement of civil society groups in the regulation process would alone eliminate the strong influence of political and economic systems on the PSM. Rather, there will be critical examination of the sphere of influence of these actors and an analysis of the interests behind these organizations.

The investigation of the respective systemic orientation horizons, the institutional arrangements and the actors' constellations is designed as a classical stakeholder analysis. This involves conducting qualitative, partially structured interviews with four different social groups of stakeholders (TVP directors, politicians, economic and civil society representatives). In the first half of 2016, key experts were questioned. Among them were the chairman and members of the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT), TVP directors, and representatives of the Committee for Public Media, as well as the chairman of the Association of Journalists (SDP Warsaw) and the chairperson of the Trade Union Confederation Wizja. The stakeholders were asked about their opinions regarding TVP governance and their own perceptions, expectations, and ideas as well as their internal and external constellations.

Finally, it can be stated, in a first analysis step, that an equally important factor which affects the autonomy of Telewizja Polska are aspects of politicization and commercialization. The role of civil society organizations and movements has been unable to prevail against the strong political and economic influences (Głowacki, 2015, pp. 31–33). Although numerous committees and social movements arose over the course of time aimed at improving PSM governance and several foundations initiated public debates, there was no change to the status-quo. The most well-known grouping to date, and one which is still active, is the Citizens Committee for Public Media (Komitet Obywatelski Mediów Publicznych), founded in 2009, which

is a prime example for the analysis of participatory media governance. The activists initiated a Draft Act on Public Service Media, which a) was aimed at permanently removing public media from political control and b) demanded a guarantee of long-term public financing.[8] The implementation of these ideals failed, just like the other committed projects in previous years did, as a result of resistance by political representatives (Borowik, 2011).

CONCLUSIONS

To examine the degree of influence the various social actors from the fields of politics, economics and civil society have on PSM governance, the above introduced network model has been applied. The model was developed from the perspective of participatory governance and actor-centered institutionalism. Media governance studies usually look at the link between policy-making and the media industries. However, PSM governance research in particular emphasizes the importance of PSM's contribution to society as a crucial element. For this reason, this project is also keenly interested in a third group of actors, namely civil society stakeholders. The concept as a framework for the analysis of often complex governance phenomena within PSM is useful as its theoretical and analytical potential includes unauthorized players with equal rights in the PSM governance analysis. In addition to the regular actors included in such analyses, such as political parties, producers, representatives of social organizations and social movements can also be a part of the analysis. These actors and their mostly informal relationships are, in fact, hardly ever included in investigations of PSM governance.

Furthermore, the participatory governance perspective combined with the actor-centered institutionalism approach allows the role and behavior of the actors to be a special focus of this analysis. So, the linking of the media governance approach recommended here is in contrast to the linking of media governance with new sociological institutionalism and the regulatory structure which plays a central role there. The ACI approach allows the investigation of complex governance matters which occur over long periods of time. As a result of the actor-centered analysis, one obtains many different points on the timeline which indicate the degree of differentiation of the functional PSM sub-system, i.e., social influences (political, economic, and public). As there is a theoretical differentiation perspective behind the ACI approach, similar to that behind the pure systems theory, various grades of differentiation can be defined with this approach, i.e., the degree of dependency on other systems and the status of its own systemic autonomy.

In addition to the innovative view of civil society as a partner in relation to media governance, there is a critical examination of the system character of the PSM

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[8] *Komitet Obywatelski Mediów Publicznych*. Retrieved September 29–30, 2016, from: http://www.polityka.pl/kultura/aktualnoscikulturalne/303377,1,komitet-obywatelski-mediow-publicznych.read.

organization as such in the perspective presented here. The way of viewing the PSM organization from the ACI perspective as an independent, partially functional system is innovative. Because, in precisely the same way as civil society and the audience, the PSM organization is also denied its own independent, autonomous character.

According to all the advantages mentioned from the application of the participatory governance and the ACI approach, there is a need to apply them together with the PSM analysis model for respective PSM governance. A suitable media system for the initial application is the Polish public service media governance. The respective points in time for conducting the investigation were determined by milestones of the Broadcasting Act amendments or the attempts, usually after a change of government, to apply political influence (pressure) on broadcasting legislation. In this way, the change process of PSM regulation can be divided into several phases. As a result, various stages of differentiation processes which are connected to (media) transformation research can be identified and also, for example, the respective degree of politicization can be determined.

In the same way, phases of the increased commitment and involvement of civil society can be identified. In addition, with this method, it is possible to ascertain what level of importance is attributed to the PSM remit and to what degree other systemic orientations are represented. With the final results, it will become clear exactly which force at which point on the timeline had the most influence on PSM governance in Poland and what motivation lay behind this force.

Finally, especially with the aid of semi-structured interviews, it becomes possible to examine the question of whether civil society in Poland deserves the status of actor in the sense of actor-centered institutionalism, and what motivation is behind its public commitment. The assumption that Telewizja Polska may be regarded as an autonomous social organization with its own public values can influence the view of PSM in Poland by the actors involved and by society as a whole. This could help to strengthen PSM governance as well as its role in society.

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Polish discourses concerning the Spanish Civil War. Analysis of the Polish press 1936–2015

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ABSTRACT: The Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939, as an ideologised and mythologised event, has been and is still used instrumentally within the Polish public discourse. The war was an important subject for the Polish press in the years 1936–1939. The Catholic, national-democratic, and conservative press supported General Franco's rebellion. The governmental and pro-government press also supported the rebels. The Christian-democratic and peasants' party press remained neutral. The social democratic, communist, and radical press backed the Spanish Republic — as did liberal-conservative organs such as *Wiadomości Literackie*. After the Second World War, the Polish communist media created the positive legend of Polish participants in the Spanish Civil War in the International Brigades, labelling Franco's post-war regime fascist. In contemporary Poland, the same division within the Polish political scene as in 1936–1939 can be observed. Starting in 1990, the Spanish Civil War, as a subject of the Polish political discourse, has been the source of heated disputes, whose participants often present more radical views and narratives. The key issues that entered the canon of Polish political disputes after 1989 (the International Brigades of volunteers, religious crimes, the support of fascists and communists for opposite sides of the conflict), are concentrated along the lines of the dispute arising from the debate within pre-war Poland: the clash of the traditional, Catholic world with the communist revolution.

KEYWORDS: International Brigades, political discourse in Poland, Polish political press, Spanish Civil War, collective memory.

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INTRODUCTION

In the article I present the contemporary Polish discourses concerning the Spanish Civil War. The analysis is based on the data taken from Polish newspapers and journals. The scientific method for investigating are content analysis and discourse analysis. The article is organized into two sections. The first discusses the Polish discourse in the years 1936–1989. The second is a presentation of contemporary discourses concerning the war. Thus, the objective of the paper is, firstly, a comparative

study of the public discourses from three periods (1936–1939; 1945–1989; 1990–2015), and secondly, a diagnosis of relations between these discourses and the political regimes in Poland: authoritarian, totalitarian, and transitional democratic. According to the area of discourse studies, I use the rhetorical perspective to the discourse analysis (DA), which is appropriate to study, when the statements are expressed "in the awareness of a differing or opposing view" (Leith & Myerson, 1989, p. 2). Then the analysis of speakers, sources of information, language, is understood as a symbolic power rivalry (Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991). In this context I understand the discourse as the political phenomenon, because it reproduces the social order and is the tool of political control.

The Spanish Civil War, which in this article serves as the subject matter for research on political instrumentalization, was a consequence of the political conflict of 'two Spains': the traditional, Catholic, and conservative one, and the liberal, leftist, democratic, and republican one (Beevor, 2009; Gola, 1995; Jackson, 1999; Preston, 2012; Thomas, 1995), provoking an internal military conflict. Both sides of the conflict quickly won international support, both military and rather less calculable, spiritual, as well as a feeling of solidarity with those who fought. The media's reaction was mixed, ranging from impartiality in informing readers about the situation on the battlefront, to politically committed articles containing various forms of propaganda. Such developments also occurred in Poland, both at the time of the war (1936–1939), later, and even until the present day (Bednarczuk, 2008; Glondys, 2014; Kieniewicz, 2001; Maciejewski, 1998; Opioła, 2013, p. 73–82; 2016; Sawicki, 2008).

Creating a 'non-real' sequence of events was not the initiative of Polish political journalists at all. During the Spanish Civil War, political propaganda was deliberately used by both sides of the conflict, as well as by their allies — the USSR, the Third Reich, Italy, and the Communist International (Southworth, 1977; 2002). Pieces of information that reached Poland were already biased in accordance with the author's point of view.

This raises the research question: why, in present-day Poland, do different groups care about manipulating the history of the Spanish Civil War? There might be many motives and reasons. The war still stirs up strong political myths, which are easily used to advocate radical ideas, based largely on appeals to emotion. Myths are based on beliefs, not facts, which enables the creation of irrational ideas, imposed by a group, but based on authority (Barthes, 1970, p. 31; Eliade, 1999, p. 15–16). The main research problem of the article is the question of contemporary Polish collective memories and discourses concerning the Spanish Civil War and the politics of memory. In addition, the history of the Spanish Civil War blends with the general current of the politics of memory in Poland and the review of the former political system's past. The attention of anthropologists, sociologists, and historians has been drawn to a very significant surge of interest in historical remembrance within the last 25 years, resulting in the creation of an "era of remembrance and commemoration" (Francois, 2010, p. 18–19). This new era differs from past ones in that the truth

is no longer at the centre of historical research, but rather 'fairness' seen according to current ethical standards. These are never final, but always negotiable, because they evolve together with social changes (Szpociński, 2010, p. 16). The second area of investigation will be the analysis of the mentioned three periods, to determine whether contemporary Polish discourses concerning the Spanish Civil War are the continuation of past debates, or have new political elites in the democratic Poland established new historical narratives?

POLISH DISCOURSES BETWEEN 1936–1939

The last three years of the Second Polish Republic was the time when the Spanish Civil War took place. For the Polish press, the war was among the most important subjects. In the first stages of the war (July–October 1936), it took the covers of many newspapers of different political provenance, and from this period comes the majority of press citations. Despite the growing institutionalization of the authoritarian regime in Poland, the journalistic discussion that touched upon the Spanish Civil War was quite welcome by the censorship authorities. Poland at that time had a new political situation, after the adoption of the April Constitution, Józef Piłsudski's death in 1935, and the consolidation of an authoritarian government. It was also a time of the development of major ideologies, which greatly influenced the practice and doctrine of Polish political groups, the intensification of anti-Semitism, and labour strikes and rallies (Hertz, 2003; Friszke, 1989).

The political situation in Europe and Poland at the time made the Spanish Civil War an important subject, and such was the way it was treated (Judt, 2008a, p. 613; 2008b, p. 293; 2011, p. 50). The war, seen by the majority of newspapers as the confrontation between fascism and communism, was often an excuse for political attacks, analogies with the political situation in Poland. Media scholars believe the press campaign concerning the Spanish Civil War was one of the most interesting journalistic disputes in the Second Polish Republic (Ajzner, 1968; Cieński, 1990; Habielski, 2009; Nałęcz, 1993).

Within the first months of fighting, a number of Polish journalists went to Spain. The most valuable articles, both in literary and factual terms, were regarded as those by Ksawery Pruszyński, a correspondent with *Wiadomości Literackie*, Roman Fajans (*Kurier Warszawski*), and Jędrzej Giertych (*Kurier Poznański*). Their reportages were also later published as books (Fajans, 1937; Giertych, 1937; Pruszyński, 1937). The ones by Pruszyński were nominated for the best Polish book of 1937 (*Sprawozdanie…*, 1938). The political affiliation of the reporters was totally different from one another, yet they became experts on the war, and it was common to polemicize with them and, at the same time, quote from them. Apart from those mentioned above, there were another nine war reporters in Spain during the Civil War (Czajka, 1980, p. 255–256).

The Catholic press had the largest circulation in Poland in the 1930s, and information provided by this press was rather schematic. There were three forms of sourcing information: dispatches from battlefields, commentaries touching upon the war in different ways, and testimonies of Catholics' martyrdom. One characteristic feature of the Catholic press was presenting the situation at the Spanish Civil War battlefront on the basis of the dichotomy good–bad, they–us (Macała, 1997, p. 124; Opioła, 2010a, p. 369–370; 2010b, p. 8). Right-wing parties were called 'national Spanish army', 'the defenders of faith', and 'General Franco's military movement'. The republican side was dubbed 'communists', 'reds', and 'Bolshevik hordes' (Bednarczuk, 2008, p. 125–133). Due to the actions of the Catholic press, epithets such as 'freemason', 'Jew', and 'communist' became, in the context of the war, synonyms. For catholic journalists, the significance of what was going on in Spain did not allow for impartiality; even more than that, it was demanded to distinctly stand on one side of the conflict or the other. The bishops wanted people to present such an attitude: "nothing more is left for mankind and the nations than to choose between Christianity and Satanism, speaking today through communism and atheism" (*W chwili…*, 1936).

The government and conservative press (the conservatives at this time backed the Polish government's policies) tried to show the Spanish Civil War objectively, although there were also cases of pro-Franco pieces of journalism in editorials. The policies of the Polish government constituted a set of incitements for covering the war this way. At League of Nations meetings, Foreign Minister Józef Beck and Ambassador Tytus Komarnicki indirectly backed Italy and the Third Reich through acting against the USSR's actions aimed at introducing a ban on the Axis countries' intervention in Spain (Maciejewski, 1998, p. 275). Conservative press journalism was traditionally anti-communist. It saw a dangerous game in the war in Spain, which should be won by the national side; otherwise "Italy and Germany will do anything in their power not to allow the communist revolution to last in Spain" (*Ponure cienie…*, 1937).

Polish National Democracy's (ND) attitude towards the Spanish Civil War was original, stemming from a different way of understanding leadership. ND, as a nationalist movement often emphasising its own anti-fascist stance, had reservations concerning any form of personality cult (Kotowski, 2006, p. 217–218). Thus, the press did not have a one-sided view of General Franco, who was glorified by both the conservatives and Catholic press. ND rejected totalitarianism as a possible form of government to introduce in Poland. A materialistic worldview and cult of violence with a lack of respect towards human dignity were the factors that kept ND away from such ideas (Komarnicki, 1937; Wasiutyński, 1936). Among groups that backed Franco's 'crusade', ND respected the Carlist Movement, and the quasi-fascist Falange was treated with reserve, if not total rejection. As Jędrzej Giertych wrote: "Falange Española — this is Spanish fascism (…) this is a reverse Marxism (…) how easy the socialist masses could transform into fascist ones" (Giertych, 1937,

p. 331–332). Despite these doctrinal reservations, as well as typically anti-German attitude, the majority of ND journalists accepted the necessity of Italian and German intervention in Spain. This help was seen as effective strength in the struggle against communism (Bartoszewicz, 1937; Maciejewski, 1998, p. 280). Wojciech Wasiutyński made a remark that "for Spain this war is a blessing (…). The communist anti-religion woke Spain up. It forced Spain to dig out the one thing that was precious within the nation, however deformed and gilded with gold just like baroque statues — Catholicism. The very fact that the people of Spain have something to die for is priceless for the country" (Wasiutyński, 1936).

On the other side of this journalistic battle was the press of the so-called democratic group, as well as press organs of the radical left. The democratic group was a conglomerate of political opposition parties, which were bound only by opposition towards power aiming at introducing an authoritarian regime. There were — political parties and their press organs — both conservative-liberal groups (such as *Wiadomości Literackie, Polonia*), socialists (*Robotnik, Czarno na Białem*) and peoples' parties (*Zielony Sztandar, Piast, Gazeta Grudziądzka*). The democratic press' attitude towards the war was deeply diversified, beginning with neutral waiting or criticising the war, to supporting the Spanish Republic. Antoni Słonimski — one of the most engaged journalists in the political campaign against anti-Semitism and fascism in Poland — often commented on what was happening on the other side of the Pyrenees (Słonimski, 1936a; 1936b). The leader of the Christian democrats, Wojciech Korfanty, despite being a declared anti-communist, criticised actions carried out by General Franco's people (Korfanty, 1936). The *Wiadomości Literackie* reporter in Spain was Ksawery Pruszyński, a conservative journalist. His reports from war-torn Spain in 1936 and 1937 were met with a lot of replies and comments. According to some of them, he moved from a conservative, traditional position to the left wing. Indeed, his first reports comprised reflections proving that he had been experiencing something new. "This fight goes much wider: it hides away more promises and threats for them, who will wind up inside of it" (Pruszyński, 1936).

The official press organ of the socialists — *Robotnik* (*The Worker*) — was actively engaged on the side of the Spanish Republic. This newspaper's journalism was dominated by emphasising the class character of the Spanish conflict and believing in an international, fascist conspiracy (Niedziałkowski, 1936). It stressed that the rebellion was against legal authority and started to defend the interests of the bourgeoisie that was not ready to take the loss of privileges easily (Boski, 1936).

The radical left's press was instrumental in promoting help and solidarity with the republican government in Spain. For the communists, one characteristic feature was that the subject matter of any articles published in the communist press (*Czerwony Sztandar*, *Dziennik Popularny*) was pre-imposed by the Political Bureau of the Polish Communist Party (*Komunistyczna Partia Polski*, KPP), which could not allow any polemical texts to be published. They helped Spain by raising money and illegally recruiting volunteers for the International Brigades, through

which there were a few hundred volunteers from Poland who made it to Spain. But there were 4,000 Polish soldiers fighting as volunteers for the republicans, although the majority of them — farmers and miners from the north of France and Belgium — came to Spain without the consent of the KPP (see for example Bron, 1967, p. 229; Toruńczyk, 1965, p. 185–187). The propaganda effort of the communist press was targeted at Poles, in order to convince them that the power behind starting the war was international fascism (Górecki, 1936). The newspapers devoted a lot of space to stories told by the Polish volunteers fighting in Spain (*Polscy robotnicy…*, 1936).

DISCOURSES IN THE PERIOD 1945–1989

The discourse concerning the Spanish Civil War during 1945–1989 was marked mainly by the communist doctrine of the place of the media within the political system, which demanded the common ownership of mass media and its functioning on two basic features: journalists should be formal members of the Communist Party — conveyor belts between the party and the masses; and, mass media content is the extension of Marxism-Leninism. In fact, however, analysis of the language and character of political journalism between 1945–1989 points to times of hardened censorship intertwined with moments of thaw.

Propaganda's attitude towards the Spanish Civil War might be analysed through the engagement of the Dąbrowszczacy — Polish combatants of the war — into Polish political life after 1945. Up to 1947–1948, the number of combatants within the administration, army, and Communist Party increased, and then fell rapidly. The prestige of the Dąbrowszczacy at the beginning of the introduction of the communist regime stemmed from being well-prepared for political duty, as well as intelligence and military ones, together with the legend surrounding General Karol 'Walter' Świerczewski, the commander of the International Brigades and one of the highest party officials at the time, up to his death in 1947. During the Stalinist period (1949–1955), the Dąbrowszczacy were politically repressed, lawsuits were filed against them, and they lost their jobs. In 1956, with the emerging political thaw, came the process of rehabilitation of the Dąbrowszczacy. In the years that followed, their role became bigger and bigger, reaching its peak in the 1960s, which led to the communist legend of the Dąbrowszczacy being born — the soldiers of liberty, loyal to the ideas of communism. In the 1960s the Dąbrowszczacy were indulged both economically and ideologically (Cieński, 1990, p. 32).

The cult of the Dąbrowszczacy was an important part of the propaganda image of the Spanish Civil War. The picture of the Spanish Civil War, created according to Marxism-Leninism, included the following censorship directives:

— after the People's Front won the 1936 February election to the Spanish *Cortes Generales*, Italy and the Third Reich started organising a military plot against the Republic;

— the political force behind the plot was fascism and the political regime which stemmed from the war was a fascist one;

— the war was in reality a struggle for national independence against the Third Reich and Italy's military intervention. The Spanish nation backed the legal government of the Second Spanish Republic;

— remaining silent about the existence of anarchists in Spain and revolutionary Comintern parties in the anti-Franco coalition;

— emphasising the leading role of the KPP and the Communist Party of France in recruiting Polish volunteers;

— remaining silent about the left's atrocities against the Church and clergy;

— emphasising the fact that the Second Polish Republic's government deprived the Dąbrowszczacy of their Polish citizenship;

— the United States actively cooperated with Franco's people during the war and during their dictatorship (Opioła, 2016, p. 185–189).

SPANISH CIVIL WAR IN THE POLISH PRESS AFTER 1989

The process of political change that started in the spring of 1989 enabled people to freely express their opinions in the mass media, and also made it possible for political minorities to be heard. As the capitalist media market emerged and political options crystallised, it turned out that there are, in contrast to previous periods of time, more than two or three narratives concerning the Spanish Civil War. There are currently many social and political circles that regard the war in a different way: the Catholic Church, descendants of the Dąbrowszczacy, liberal Catholics, the new left, traditionalists, liberal conservatives, and others. Any attempt at categorising them is often impossible, because they alter with time. One cannot attribute one idea/opinion with certain political groups. Despite this, a simplified style concerning the war is still present in present day journalism, which depicts the war as a struggle between two ideas and has a polemical character. The general tendency is, if some commentators trying to see the war from the point of view, for example, of humanism, the tragedy of individuals, or academic disciplines, and seeing it as a multi-layered problem, are tagged by any doctrinal-thinking adversaries, most often as the left, because in this discourse the right gained the early ground.

Still, among those participating in the discourse are groups characterised by a consistent attitude towards the Spanish Civil War, expressed in journalism as an element of political interest realisation. For the needs of this article they will be called 'the right', 'the central', and 'the left' camps on the stipulation that these names are just conventional and relate to attitudes of the Spanish Civil War only. The history of the war is an important element of these groups' identities, for not only do they often appeal to it, but also see the debate around it as an ideological discourse, something more important than an academic dispute over facts. In the context of political meaning of the war, adversaries only agree on one point — the war has a

great myth-creating potential; however, each side of the argument accuses the other of mythologization of history, treating its own version as the true one. In the committed journalism, Krzysztof Lubczyński, in the social democratic *Trybuna*, writes about the 'falsified myth' of the war (Lubczyński, 2007), and Adam Wielomski, in the conservative *Najwyższy Czas!* about a seventy-year-long myth (Wielomski, 2006), although each of them believes the myth to be the other's version of events.

Is there, therefore, any space to distinguish the third kind of discourse, whose representatives I have called the central camp? Certainly there is, although right-wing journalism treats the remaining discourses (left-wing and central) concerning the war as basically the same, as they were antagonistic towards the Catholic, right-wing version. At the same time it accuses authors representing other points of view of having a liking for communism, even Stalinism. "We are witnessing a left-wing intrusive usurpation of the all-world intellectual discourse. It manifested itself, among others, by a brutal moral blackmail, according to which each conservative, right-wing, anti-communist phenomenon was labelled as 'Hitlerism'" — says Marek Jan Chodakiewicz (2003). "A one-sided picture of Spain during the war and almost 40-year-long administration of Franco, the picture being the product of zealous measures of communist propaganda and the unforgivable ignorance of the enlightened, a falsified one, is a classic example of the stereotype, which took place of the vibrant (…) truth. It was imposed on the collective awareness and lingers until the present day" — wrote Tomasz Burek (2007) in the bi-monthly *Arcana*. "Today's Franco's image in Poland is still the one established during communist times, the image of a fascist and criminal" — remarked Marcin Wolski in *Gazeta Polska* (2007).

Such allegations cannot be agreed with. The central camp's point of view should be rather treated as conservation of the pre-war newspapers' discourse: *Robotnik* and *Wiadomości Literackie*, at the same time upholding the ideals of personalism and liberalism. One characteristic feature of the centre groups' attitudes is seeing the war as a complex and tragic conflict. From this point of view it was impossible to opt for one of the parties. These groups' journalists would not agree to relativize crimes committed by both sides of the conflict, and they are usually far from seeing the conflict as the struggle of two totalitarian systems. They often refer to Ksawery Pruszyński's and George Orwell's texts, but also to Georges Bernanos and Simone Weil's ones (Bernanos, 1998; Orwell, 2006; Pruszyński, 1937; Weil, 1998). Cezary Michalski, a well-known Polish journalist, sees the Spanish conflict from the centrist position as one of the left founding myths, ritualised by it with bias and similarly demystified by the right (Michalski, 1999). Remembrance of the Spanish Civil War was preserved through generations of People's Poland and was stained with totalitarian propaganda a lot less than right-wing authors thought. Analysis of the journalism shows that it was the right-wing propaganda that won the battle for post-1989 Polish public opinion concerning the war.

Left-wing journalism, on the other hand, partly freed itself of the propaganda influence of the Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa (PRL) era, although it still duplicated some of the myths, for example, those treating the war as a prelude to the

Second World War and a training ground for Hitler and Mussolini, which present themselves as the new paradigm of the Spanish Civil War (Ikonowicz, 2006; Wielgosz, 2006). At the same time there is a traditional, left-wing, anti-fascist paradigm, which takes a form very similar to that from the PRL years. The reactionary groups of scheming generals are sometimes referred to in the left-wing media as 'Franco's fascists', 'fascist nationalists', or 'fascist falangists' (Lubczyński, 2007).

The debate on the Spanish Civil War emerges in the Polish media from time to time and is not always connected with celebrating anniversaries. One can see periods when the media devotes a lot of time and space to this. The wealthiest time regarding the presence of journalism concerning the war started in 2005. There are many factors behind this, of which the most important is the introduction of anti-communist political use of history by Law and Justice (PiS), where coming to terms with the history of the Dąbrowszczacy and the war itself is quite an important aspect. The issue of the Dąbrowszczacy's moral responsibility for combatant's crimes and depriving them of their combatant entitlements has been raised twice so far. The first debate on this started as early as 1990 and lasted until 1997; it was also touched upon again in 2006–2007. It should also be admitted that since the Third Polish Republic was founded, the leftist influence on the media has diminished. More and more newspapers and magazines have been closed, some others still exist, but their circulation figures are way below those of the mainstream or rightist press.

"One group within the Polish right, the one having the closest ties to nationalism and clericalism, sees something worth following in general Franco's policies (…) praising his actions and agreeing that one is allowed to kill his opponents in order to force respect and obedience, stemming from the values of the right" — says Jorge Ruiz Lardizabal (2008), a Spanish news agency EFE correspondent in Poland. Which arguments make General Franco the saviour of the Polish right? Adam Wielomski, a historian and conservative journalist, saw a few fundamental advantages of the political system created by the dictator: stabilising the political situation in Spain for 40 years, defending the country from the possibility of far left rule, not taking part in the Second World War, balancing between the two groups fighting in the Second World War, and the economic liberalisation of the 1950s and 1960s (Wielomski, 2006). To back up this view, it seems that much was done by Stefan Kisielewski, the right's oracle in many fields, who spoke of his warm feelings towards the Spanish dictator (Kisielewski, 1996, p. 383). The Polish right generally associates the Spanish Civil War with the conflict between the two great worldview concepts, accepting the paradigm of the crusade against communism in order to defend Catholicism. Right-wing journalists very often emphasise that the war was the first win over communism in history (Martín Rubio, 2006, p. 27). This simple, one-sided understanding of the war presented by the Polish right is often created by journalists who do not possess proper historical expertise. Thus, articles aiming at becoming meticulously given evidence are not free of factual errors. A similar set of objections was articulated in the reviews of Marek Jan Chodakiewicz's book about

the war published in 1997 (Chodakiewicz, 1997). Paweł Machcewicz (a historian and political scientist) accused the author of going in for journalism, not sticking to the facts, and "by all means legitimately undermining the leftist myths, substitutes them with different ones coming from the ideologically opposite stands" (Machce-wicz, 1997). As Chodakiewicz understood them, the attitudes towards the Spanish Civil War in post-1989 Poland (up to 1997) were down to supporters of the PRL and the left-wing youth movements on one side and anti-communists on the other. He rejected the possibility of neutral attitudes within this area, although Machcewicz tried to prove that such attitudes exist and are natural.

Stefan Niesiołowski, previously a Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) and cur-rently Civic Platform (PO) MP, reacted to Machcewicz's review: "The Spanish Civil War is fascinating because the idea of justice was the winner there; the communists did not succeed in forcing *The Gulag Archipelago* onto the catholic nation" — he wrote in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, accusing Machcewicz of using argumentative means belonging to the PRL era (Niesiołowski, 1998). Niesiołowski reminded that in 1990 he supported taking veteran status away from the Dąbrowszcacy and that his stance had not altered, which is why he stood by Chodakiewicz on this. In this way, there-fore, a review of a historical text started a political debate, which consisted of two distinct sides. The dispute in *Gazeta Wyborcza* was ended by additional explana-tions by Stefan Niesiołowski and Paweł Machcewicz.

For some on the right wing of the Polish political spectrum, General Francisco Franco has been a positive character, which seems to be of meaning to the position of Poland in international relations. In *Wprost*, Paweł Skibiński, a historian and right-wing journalist, enumerated the advantages of the Spanish dictator — being friendly towards the Polish independence camp in the PRL, saving Jews from the Holocaust, and entering into diplomatic relations with the Polish government-in-exile. In his opinion, the Spanish Civil War was fuelled mainly by Moscow and the Comintern (Skibiński, 2002). A set of similar views were stated in the now defunct *Ozon* magazine, where he defended the Polish MEP Maciej Giertych in the wake of an incident that he triggered in the European Parliament (2006). In July 2006, Maciej Giertych (son of Jędrzej Giertych, the leader of the pre-war nationalists, who in 1936 was a correspondent in Spain), an MEP for the right-wing The League of Polish Families, gave a speech on the 70th anniversary of General Franco's coup. "Due to General Franco's actions, the communist attack on Catholic Spain was not successful" — said Giertych (*Przemówienie…*, 2006). "Maciej Giertych liked gen-erals, who lead nations by harsh methods. In December 1981 he praised Jaruzel-ski for introducing martial law. (…) The Giertychs (Maciej Giertych and his son — Roman, who, at that time, acted as a deputy prime minister and the minister of education of Poland) would like to see Polish history in black-and-white, with themselves always on the side of the white" — replied Jarosław Kurski, a *Gazeta Wyborcza* journalist (2006). Polish MEPs were outraged by Giertych's comments, saying, amongst other things, that praising fascism included in a public speech is

harmful to the way Poland was seen internationally (*Oświadczenie…*, 2006). The diplomatic and political row with Francoism in the background caused by Giertych became the reason to refresh — on the 70th anniversary — the Polish memory concerning the history of the Spanish Civil War, and at the same time the memory was politically instrumentalized. Both sides — Giertych, calling the supporters of Spanish Republic 'communists', and the Polish MEPs, labelling francoism as 'fascism' — manipulated, using these 'myths' as propaganda tools.

At the time of the debate on the political use of Spanish history, there was a discussion going on in the right-wing media on Spanish Catholicism. The issue was important for the right because there are many politicised phenomena in it: the engagement of Spanish clergy into the war and Franco's regime, John Paul II's participation in beatification processes of Spanish martyrs, confrontation with a view that Spain is a Catholic country, and, finally, the reaction to Zapatero's anticlerical and modernist policies. Polish Catholic groups are divided as to the above-mentioned issues, although all of them treat Spanish Catholicism as a 'problem' (Skibiński, 2006b, p. 23–24). There are different opinions concerning the Spanish clergy's attitude to Francoism: ranging from critical opinions (among others archbishop Józef Życiński 2006); through attempts at excusing it with the political interest: "It was a natural defensive stance built on the connection with the nationalists", wrote Marta Zając in *Tygodnik Powszechny* (2003); to utterances full of acceptance towards an alliance of throne and altar (Bartnik, 2008; Małecki, 2009). The tone stemming from Catholic journalism is often very similar to the one from before the war. This tone is as emotional as the pre-war one, and conspiracy thinking usual, with the exception of the Jew-masonic conspiracy being replaced by the atheistic one (see for example Bartnik, 2008).

One subject that has been touched upon most often — apart from attitudes towards Francoism — was the attitude towards the Dąbrowszczacy. In the 1990s, when right-wing coalitions ruled Poland, there were several attempts at taking veteran privileges away from Polish veterans of the Spanish Civil War. The anticommunist right perceived, and still does perceive veterans as criminals, just like those who unleashed the Stalinist machine of terror. The Dąbrowszczacy were defended not only by the old establishment, but also by the left-wing democratic opposition, some right-wing journalists and historians, and families and friends of the Dąbrowszczacy. One of the first protests against depriving the Dąbrowszczacy of their veteran status was Michał Komar's, a former Dąbrowszczak's son, a screenwriter and film critic, open letter to a newspaper. He wrote that these veterans are a part of the 'noble myth' that within the ranks of the International Brigades, apart from communists, there were socialists, and various kinds of democrats, Christian ones too (Komar, 1990). The next time depriving the Dąbrowszczacy of their veteran status was upon them was in 1993. The parliamentary committee concluded its proceedings on the parliamentary act in the latter part of 1994 and again the Dąbrowszczacy were not deprived of their status. In 1995 the veterans' privileges act

was vetoed by then president Lech Wałęsa, who did not want to agree to formally treat the Dąbrowszczacy as veterans (Lipiński, 1997).

This debate came back to light in 2006 as one of PiS' elements of the politics of memory. This time, the newspaper debate had even stronger ideological overtones, as potentially depriving the Dąbrowszczacy of their veteran status was a matter for only the few of them still alive.

On March 30th, the leftist daily *Trybuna* published a long article depicting the Dąbrowszczacy's fortunes. The author — Piotr Skura — called the PiS law-making initiative 'a repressive idea of the IV RP rulers', stating that the Dąbrowszczacy's 'crime' was "binding themselves for the duration of the war with the leftist underground movement, and after the war — creation of the new order and rebuilding the homeland from ruins" (Skura, 2007). At the very same time, *Gazeta Wyborcza* informed about the Senate of Spain protest against the Polish parliamentary act concerning depriving Polish veterans of the war (mas, 2007).

The most important event, which triggered the long exchange of publications on the matter, was the *Gazeta Wyborcza* article of April 25th, titled *Apel Antygony*. It was an open letter on the Dąbrowszczacy written by Barbara Toruńczyk, daughter of Henryk Toruńczyk — the commander of the International Brigades division in 1939. It was a protest against erasing the Dąbrowszczacy from the collective memory and destroying their good name. The letter was signed by a few hundred people, descendants of Polish fighters in the war, and many public personalities: philosopher Leszek Kołakowski, historian Krzysztof Pomian, and Marek Edelman (the last leader of the Ghetto uprising). The letter expressed outrage at forcing on MPs "their own vision of history, coupled with disavowing defenceless seniors which shatters the meaning of their lives into pieces" (*Apel Antygony*, 2007). Moreover, the letter reminded that for many people born after 1945, the Spanish Civil War acted as a model for "pursuing freedom within post-Yalta Europe filled with the ice of totalitarianism and the Cold War" (ibid.). It is worth mentioning that the Spanish Republican government in exile accepted the Yalta system after 1945, contrary to anti-communist Franco's regime (see Kaczorowski, 2014). The letter was re-published by the Madrid daily *El País* (May 29th) and *Zeszyty Literackie* (no. 2/2007).

The letter triggered a wide debate in leading Polish newspapers, in which a few dozen people participated. Right-wing journalists polemicised with the content of the letter using the same arguments that they had used previously. "Crimes against prisoners of war, extermination of the clergy, executions of teachers, lawyers, clerks and other "plutocrats" — such were the heroic deeds of the revolutionary Spanish people, whom the *Gazeta Wyborcza* letters' authors try to present as worth-following fighters for a noble cause" — wrote Rafał Ziemkiewicz, a popular right-wing journalist, in *Rzeczpospolita* (2007). A fortnight later in the same newspaper, historian Piotr Gontarczyk called the Dąbrowszczacy "faithful Stalin's soldiers ready to follow all his orders (…) riders of the communist apocalypse" (Gontarczyk, 2007). The author accused them indirectly of the extermination of the Spanish clergy and

destroying the Church in this country. Left-wing *Krytyka Polityczna* circles defended the Dąbrowszczacy by publishing an open letter on the 70th anniversary of the bombing of Guernica. "Fascism will not survive. NO PASARAN!" — was the highlight of the letter (*Faszyzm nie przejdzie*, 2007).

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of contemporary discourses concerning the Spanish civil war shows that, for the struggle for symbolic power, the analysed topic matters. The actors of the discourse are not only historians and descendants of Polish volunteers, but also important political figures (president, deputies, MEPs, clergy). It is also evident, that the history of the Spanish Civil War was used as a propaganda tool, both as a political myth for right and left-wing politicians (antifascist and anti-communist references in the narratives) and as a rhetoric figure. It is worth mentioning that both of these *clichés*, are still very strongly exposed in Polish historical and political debate. All historical books concerning the war, translated and edited in Poland, must be labelled in the media as 'written by' either a leftist, liberal, or right-wing historian. This is a process of the ideologisation of history. However, the Spanish Civil War and its key contexts for Polish remembrance are no longer crucial to the current debate. It is vanishing not because the trauma has passed, the ideological reconciliation occurred, or the compromise settled on — with the years that have gone by, there are a number of people for whom the war carries features of an important myth, an element forming civic ethos.

When it comes to the second research problem, the comparison of the three analysed periods shows that there is no chronological succession of the discourses. The main findings from the analysis of the period 1945–1989, shows the process of negation prior discourses. Again, in 1989, the former narrative was denied. We can also observe the return to the 1936–1939 narratives. The liberal narrative should be treated as conservation of the pre-war newspapers' discourse: *Robotnik* and *Wiadomości Literackie*. The characteristic feature is seeing the war as a complex and tragic conflict. Left-wing journalism, on the other hand, partly freed itself of the propaganda influence of the 1945–1989 era, although it still duplicated some of the myths. Analysis also shows that the right-wing narrative won the battle for post-1989 Polish public opinion concerning the war.

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Rhetorical continuity and shifts in war messages: George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush on Iraq

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ABSTRACT: This article focuses on rhetorical continuity and shifts in the use of the genre of American war rhetoric. Drawing on Lloyd Bitzer's understanding of the rhetorical situation, the article analyses the political circumstances in which George H. W. Bush in 1991 and George W. Bush in 2002 constructed and delivered their messages. It then examines and compares the addresses for particular typologies of war rhetoric as defined by Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson and by Edward J. Lordan. With the rhetorical elements identified, the article discusses the implications of the adherence to and departures from the genre's criteria for presidential war discourse.

KEYWORDS: war, rhetoric, Gulf War, Iraq War, George H.W. Bush, George W. Bush.

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INTRODUCTION

Two areas of research are relevant to this study. Firstly, the existing literature regarding the genre of presidential war rhetoric is reviewed to highlight the recurrent elements central to the American convention of presidential war rhetoric. Secondly, the studies regarding President George W. Bush's Iraq war rhetoric are reviewed to indicate which questions regarding the president's war discourse have attracted the most scholarly attention.

Scholars in the field of rhetorical studies have presented several typologies designed to capture the nature of presidential war rhetoric. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson (1990) offer five characteristics of presidential war messages: (1) thoughtful consideration; (2) narration of events; (3) a call to unanimity and dedication; (4) legitimation of the role of the commander-in-chief; and (5) strategic misrepresentations. James Benjamin (1991) suggests that presidential war messages have at least two functions: (1) historical outline of the justification for war; and (2) a description of the president's aims and objectives. Edward J. Lordan (2010) advances the predictability of presidential war statements by identifying six

interrelated themes: (1) self-protection; (2) the enemy as the aggressor; (3) Just War Theory; (4) moral superiority; (5) the inevitability of conflict; (6) and guaranteed victory; and persuasive tools: (1) argument structure; (2) fear tactics; (3) techniques used to reinforce the good intentions and morality of the message; (4) simplification; and (5) a shift in emphasis.

Research on Bush's war rhetoric pays little attention to whether the tradition of the genre applies to the president's war discourse. Studies focusing on Bush's war rhetoric suggest that researchers have focused on three questions in particular: First, how public support for the Iraq War was encouraged (Hill et al., 2010; Kerton-Johnson, 2008; Belanger, 2005; Schubert et al., 2002), how the language to sell the war was constructed (Cartledge et al., 2015; Bartolucci, 2012; Maggio, 2007; Smith, 2005), and how the accuracy and legitimacy of the rationale for the war pushed through the war agenda, facilitated media support, and drove military action (Oddo, 2011; Coe, 2011; Esch, 2010; Fisher, 2010; Kellner, 2007; Pfiffner, 2004).

A considerable amount of literature examines Bush's war discourse in a comparative perspective. Concentrating on the language that promotes war, Justin Rex (2011) contrasts Bush's impact on the agenda for the Iraq War with McKinley's influence on setting the agenda for the Spanish-American War. John Oddo (2011) weighs the president's language to push for the war in Iraq against Franklin D. Roosevelt's linguistic strategies and thematic formations used to win support for the US entering World War II. Focusing on presidential interaction patterns, Gary R. Hess (2006) compares George W. Bush's congressional-executive exchange over war making in 2002 with George H.W. Bush's attempts to seek congressional resolutions authorizing the use of force in 1991. Carol Winkler (2007) contrasts the communication of Bush with the public on the questions of invading Iraq with Ronald Reagan's efforts to win public support for the bombing of Libya. Antonio Lambino (2011) juxtaposes Bush's statements justifying continued American engagement in Iraq with McKinley's and Theodore Roosevelt's messages arguing for sustained military commitment in the Philippines. Similarly, Louis Fisher (2010) compares the justifications made by Bush for initiating military action against Iraq with claims for the use of force made by his predecessors: James K. Polk before the Mexican-American War, Abraham Lincoln before the Civil War, William McKinley before the Spanish-American War, Woodrow Wilson before World War I, Roosevelt before World War II, Harry S. Truman before the Korean War, Lyndon B. Johnson before the Vietnam War, and Ronald Reagan before the Iran-Contra Affair.

What appears to be missing from the literature is a comparative study of the war rhetoric of George W. Bush and George H.W. Bush. This article fills this gap by juxtaposing the two presidents' war rhetoric as exemplified in an Address to the Nation on Iraq delivered on 7 October 2002 in Cincinnati, Ohio, and a Radio Address to the Nation on the Persian Gulf Crisis from 5 January 1991. There are three primary goals of the article:

— To identify parallels and differences between the rhetorical situations calling for war rhetoric against Iraq in 2002 and in 1991.

— To determine whether the second President Bush's rhetoric complied with or undermined the conventions of war discourse.

— To ascertain the political implications of the rhetorical continuity of or shifts in the generic tradition.

The discussion attempts to provide answers to the following questions: What were the constituent parts of the rhetorical situation in 2002 and how were they similar to or different from the exigencies, audiences, and constraints in 1991? Which persuasive tools dominated in the second President Bush's discourse? Was the second President Bush's rhetoric a departure or a continuation of the first President Bush's language? Finally, did the components demonstrate stability or change in the use of the genre? In the pages that follow, this article argues that despite compelling situational differences between the Persian Gulf War and the Iraq War, the presidents used comparable war language. It is suggested that the second President Bush adhered to the generic convention. While the constituent parts of his rhetorical situation were different, the basic components of his war messages remained largely the same.

The article traces shifts and continuity in the use of the genre in three phases. Firstly, it analyses the rhetorical situations in which presidential rhetoric was constructed and delivered. It examines the circumstances that necessitated military operations, the nature of US ultimatums to Iraq, the grounds for the use of force, and the scale of support provided by the Uniteded Nations, the US Congress, and the American public to reveal the shifts in the circumstances leading to military action. Secondly, the article contrasts the war messages of both presidents for particular typologies of war rhetoric as defined by Campbell and Jamieson (1990) and Lordan (2010). It measures the speeches against the genre's themes of thoughtful consideration, narration of events, a call to unanimity and dedication, legitimation of the role of the commander-in-chief, and strategic misrepresentations, as well as against conventional argument structure, fear tactics, and techniques used to reinforce the good intentions and morality of the message to reflect rhetorical continuity in presidential war discourse. Thirdly, the article discusses the implications of the adherence to and departures from the genre's criteria for presidential war discourse. It suggests that presidential war messages will most likely depend on the promoted perception of a future conflict, following the same basic framework and components but offering more substantial grounding.

BACKGROUND

Based on Lloyd Bitzer's (1968, pp. 6–8) definition, the rhetorical situation is understood as "a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action

as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence". Bitzer describes the exigence as "an imperfection (…) a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be". He limits the audience to "those persons who are capable of being influenced by discourse and of being mediators of change." He refers to constraints as "persons, events, objects, and relations which are parts of the situation because they have the power to constrain decision and action needed to modify the exigence". Building on Bitzer's definition, Martin J. Medhurst (1996, pp. xv–xvi) explains that "the exigence is the engine that drives the rhetorical action — the part of the situation that is in need of remedy or resolution (…)To understand the exigence or exigences is to know what called the discourse into being in the first place". He defines the audience as "the final arbiter of persuasion or influence", and the constraints as "factors that impinge on actors in the rhetorical situation (…) are as complex as the realities of everyday life (…) and (…) are constantly changing".

An analysis of the circumstances that necessitated respective presidential speeches announcing military operations in Iraq in 1991 and in 2002 has shown that the situations calling for the presidents' messages differed in many aspects. In the case of the Persian Gulf War, the question was *whether* to confront Saddam Hussein; while in the case of the Iraq War, the question was *how* to do it. Although the first President Bush acted in reaction to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, he was not sure if force was necessary and weighed up the options (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998). The second President Bush acted in the absence of an attack situation, yet he considered looking into and choosing a military option for regime change in the country (Bamford, 2004; Clarke, 2004; Suskind, 2004). The nature of the ultimatums delivered to Iraq communicates the difference in the perceived necessity to use force (Hess, 2006). The ultimatum given in the case of the Persian Gulf War was issued forty-seven days before the launch of a full-scale coalition attack, reflecting the first President Bush's readiness to wait for non-military means to work. In the case of the Iraq War, however, the ultimatum was given forty-eight hours before the US military invasion, suggesting the second President Bush's insistence on choosing a military solution. The underlying bases for the use of force were also different. In 1991, the principal reason for authorizing the use of force was the liberation of Kuwait. Military action was launched to respond to Iraq's invasion, end its occupation of the territory, and restore Kuwait's government. While the rationales for the Iraq War restated some of the points made in 1991, they focused on Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction and its ties to terrorist organizations. Authorization of the use of force was based on the information provided by US intelligence agencies that Iraq possessed and had the ability to deliver chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and had links to al-Qaeda and the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

To receive congressional support for resolutions, which granted the president the authority to wage war, the first President Bush had to work with Congress

controlled by Democrats skeptical of the imperative of the use of force. The second president Bush, however, received uncritical support of a Republican Congress and the leaders of both parties, which made his campaign for war easier (Hess, 2006; Brands, 2004). Although both presidents argued that congressional approval did not affect their war-making authority, they both took steps to secure it. The distribution of votes in the respective Congresses reflects the difference in the presidents' partisan struggle. On 14 January 1991, narrow majorities gave the first President Bush the power to go to war — 250 votes in favor and 183 against in the House, and 52 in favor and 47 against in the Senate. On 16 October 2002, however, the approval in both chambers was more explicit — 296 in favor and 113 against in the House, and 77 in favor and 23 against in the Senate.

When seeking United Nations support for resolutions authorizing the use of force, the situation was just the opposite (Hess, 2006). The first President Bush held a strategic advantage in dealing with the UN. On 29 November 1990, he received uncritical support from the Security Council with 12 votes in favor of the invasion, two against, and one abstaining. Prior to the war authorization resolution, the United Nations Security Council condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, demanded a withdrawal of Iraqi troops from the territory, and placed comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq. When Hussein failed to comply with his international obligations, 34 countries joined the US-led invasion against Iraq. The second President Bush fell short of winning an unequivocal UN Security Council resolution authorizing military action and broad international support. While the UN Security Council unanimously passed a resolution on 8 November 2002 that offered Iraq a final chance to comply with its disarmament obligations and warning of serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations, it did not debate or vote on a resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force. Members of the UN Security Council were divided over the plans to invade Iraq, with France and Germany arguing for continued non-military measures. The international support for the war was limited too, with only four coalition states contributing their forces to the invasion.

While US actions were not contingent on UN support, going to war with coalition forces clearly strengthened the first President Bush's case against Iraq. Polls conducted shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait showed that a majority of Americans opposed the United States' taking military steps against the Iraqis by 51% to 37%. When the November UN resolution was passed, however, polls showed a 16-point rise in public support, with 53% of Americans in favour of the United States going to war and 40% against. By contrast, in the case of the Iraq War, polls showed a rise in support for the war despite the lack of a UN resolution. While public approval generally stayed at over 50% since the 9/11 attacks, shortly before the invasion it rose to 64% for the war to 33% against it. A majority of Americans said they would still approve of the invasion even if the UN decided not to join it.

FINDINGS

As defined by Campbell and Jamieson, war rhetoric is discourse "in which presidents seek to justify to the Congress and to the citizenry their exercise of war powers" (1990; p. 101). It is designed to seek or strengthen support from the US Congress and the American public either before or soon after the beginning of military operations. The genre is used to prove that force is the only appropriate response to the threat. Its narrative form details events that lead to the existence of the threat and its exhortative tone calls the public to unite. War rhetoric seeks congressional approval for assumption of war powers and uses misrepresentation of events to suppress opposition and ensure sustained support from Congress and the public for action.

These criteria hold for the 7 October 2002 address. The convention of the genre of war rhetoric requires that the decision to go to war "be presented as the outcome of thoughtful consideration" and that it "be made on rational, not emotional, grounds" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 105). The language of the president's speech reflects rational deliberation: "Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering against us". "Understanding the threats of our time, knowing the designs and deceptions of the Iraqi regime, we have every reason to assume the worst, and we have an urgent duty to prevent the worst from occurring". The argument for rational decision-making is reinforced by the assurance that issues related to "the nature of the threat" and "the urgency of action" were "discussed broadly and fully".

The speech justifies going to war in a dramatic narrative form and persuades that the existence of a threat necessitates the use of force despite efforts to find alternative means to eliminate it. "While there are many dangers in the world", Bush explained, "the threat from Iraq stands alone because it gathers the most serious dangers of our age in one place". Identifying the threat with the Iraqi regime, he urged that the Iraqi leader "must not be permitted to threaten America and the world with horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons". An assurance that all possibilities have been attempted to eliminate the threat, including "containment, sanctions, inspections, even selected military action", is followed by an assertion that the danger and its consequences persist: "opponents have been decapitated, wives and mothers of political opponents have been systematically raped as a method of intimidation, and political prisoners have been forced to watch their own children being tortured".

Because confrontation of the threat demands unanimity and commitment, the exhortative tone of the speech constitutes an audience as a united and dedicated community. "We are resolved today to confront every threat, from any source, that could bring sudden terror and suffering to America", Bush proclaimed. "We did not ask for this present challenge, but we accept it. Like other generations of Americans, we will meet the responsibility of defending human liberty against violence and aggression". Appealing to the members of Congress, he said that they were "nearing an

historic vote" and called them to "fully consider the facts and their duties". He then developed an argument for the United Nations when he said that congressional resolution would show that "America speaks with one voice and is determined to make the demands of the civilized world mean something".

The narrative and arguments it presents lay the groundwork for the "approval of presidential assumption of the office of commander in chief" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 112). The rhetoric that legitimates the role compels the president not only to make a detailed case for war but also to present conditions that require a swift reaction. "Failure to act", Bush explained, "would embolden other tyrants, allow terrorists access to new weapons and new resources, and make blackmail a permanent feature of world events". Addressing the critics of the war, he expressed the urgency of action even more explicitly: "Some have argued we should wait, and that's an option. In my view, it's the riskiest of all options, because the longer we wait, the stronger and bolder Saddam Hussein will become".

In presenting the conditions calling for a quick response, the tendency is to misrepresent events "in ways that stifle dissent and arouse the 'war temper' of Congress and the public" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 122). Available evidence proves that Bush misled Congress and the American public about Saddam Hussein and an al-Qaeda link and Iraq's possession and ability to deliver chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons (Pfiffner, 2004; Kellner, 2007). In the speech Bush said that "Iraq and Al Qaeda have had high-level contacts," that Iraq "provided safe haven to terrorists", and "trained Al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases". But a UN investigation showed that there was no link between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein (Pfiffner, 2004). He said that the regime "possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons" and that it "has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons". Yet, the evidence upon which the claims that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear programme and had chemical and biological warfare capacity was not found (Pfiffner, 2004). He said that "Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas" and that it "is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States". Again, no proof that the aircraft was constructed to carry chemical or biological warfare agents was produced (Pfiffner, 2004).

Beyond the genre's themes, the speech exemplifies conventional tools, as identified by Lordan (2010), primarily an analysis and evaluation of arguments for the war, supported by appeals to fear and morality with its determination to achieve ultimate goals. The speech applies some of the same rhetorical techniques used by the first President Bush in the address made a decade earlier. The case for war is built on a thesis that is the most important statement and the pretext for everything that follows. In the speech opening line, Bush states: "Tonight I want to take a few minutes to discuss a grave threat to peace and America's determination to lead the

world in confronting that threat". Arguments are structured in dichotomous terms. An assertion that "We know that Iraq and the Al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy — the United States of America" portrays the conflict as a confrontation, in which the United States represents the force for good, acts out of necessity, and in defense of its own and/or its allies' interests, while the enemy is the force for evil, chooses to go to war, and provokes a conflict. The emphasis is on the ultimate goals of the struggle, detracting attention away from the means and immediate, tangible negative effects and focusing on the long-term, desired ends: security of the nation, protection of its freedom, and help to others to find freedom of their own.

While, in many ways, the speech reproduces the framework and components of the 1991 speech, some variations in the use of the rhetorical forms and techniques can be observed. The speech is anchored in an assumption about a potential threat and the language that frames the hypothesis lacks decisiveness. Predictions and speculations that "Iraq could create instability and make the situation worse" or that "it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year" communicate a lack of certainty. This does not appear to be the case for the 1991 speech, which presents its thesis firmly: "1990 saw Iraq invade and occupy Kuwait. Nineteen ninety-one will see Iraq withdraw".

The speech puts forward presumptive UN requirements that would have to be fulfilled to avoid war without setting a deadline for Iraq to meet them. General threats that "Saddam Hussein must disarm himself, or for the sake of peace, we will lead a coalition to disarm him" or "if we allow [Iraq to develop a nuclear weapon] (...) a terrible line would be crossed" contrast with the 1991 uncompromising demands and time limit: "Eleven days from today, Saddam Hussein will either have met the United Nations deadline for a full and unconditional withdrawal" or "face the terrible consequences".

The narrative draws on consistent arguments and clear logic but it does not present any credible evidence for the claims it makes. Recurring statements arguing that "satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past" or "surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding facilities that it had used to produce chemical and biological weapons" serve to compensate for publicly unavailable reliable sources or data. By contrast, the 1991 account rests on solid ground. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a fact, in reaction to which "The United Nations, with the full support of the United States, has already tried to peacefully pressure Iraq out of Kuwait, implementing economic sanctions and securing the condemnation of the world in the form of no less than 12 resolutions of the U.N. Security Council".

Both speeches act on fear appeals. They link the feeling of fear to, and seem designed to invoke, a sense of urgency to take action. The themes of fear and time reinforce each other and lead to the critical, logical conclusion that the threat is imminent and steps must be taken without due delay. Their perspective is different, however. The 1991 speech discusses the present costs of Hussein's regime, including

"higher oil prices", "lower growth", and "fear, suffering, and terror for the people of Kuwait", while the 2002 speech constructs scenarios that are likely to unfold in the future: "military conflict could be difficult. An Iraqi regime faced with its own demise may attempt cruel and desperate measures".

Both speeches build their credibility on the good intentions and morality of the speaker but they differ in the approach. Appeals made in the 2002 speech are based on convictions and lack the influence of a personal war experience shared in the 1991 speech. A declaration that the president is "not willing to stake one American life on trusting Saddam Hussein" or that he is "convinced that [the hope that Saddam does not give weapons to terrorists or develop a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world] is a hope against all evidence" do not have the persuasive power of a recollection of a World War II veteran: "I've seen the hideous face of war and counted the costs of conflict in friends lost" or a promise that "There will be no more Vietnams" made by an experienced congressman and the former ambassador to the United Nations.

In demonizing and dehumanizing the enemy, the 2002 speech expands the conceptualization of the enemy to a system of rule: "The threat comes from Iraq. It arises directly from the Iraqi regime's own actions — its history of aggression and its drive toward an arsenal of terror". In the 1991 speech, however, the conceptualization of the enemy is contracted to an individual: "Saddam already poses a strategic threat (...) Each day that passes increases Saddam's worldwide threat to democracy". As a result, statements that "America is a friend to the people of Iraq" and that its "demands are directed only at the regime that enslaves them", which differentiate between the people of the enemy's nation and the enemy's ruling system, appear only in the 2002 speech.

Finally, citations of third-party support are more common in the 2002 speech. References to US presidents, a UN official, and an international organization outnumber one mention of support coming from the ruler of Kuwait made in the 1991 speech.

CONCLUSIONS

Much of the existing research represents Bush's war rhetoric as consistent with the criteria of the genre of war discourse followed by earlier wartime presidents. Studies illustrate Bush's similar choice of tools in the attempt to sell the war against Iraq to the public (Oddo, 2011). Strategic misrepresentation is in the center of scholarly attention. Researchers trace the continuity of the war rhetoric convention focusing on the president's falsification, fabrication, distortion, and exaggeration of facts and evidence (Fisher, 2010). They argue for the president's compliance with the genre's criterion despite differences in exigences and constraints of his rhetorical situation. Critics of the US military intervention in Iraq draw analogies between the Iraq War and the Vietnam War, symbolizing US military failure, while supporters of Bush's

policies in Iraq compare the War on Terror to the Cold War, a symbol of US success (Lambino, 2011).

The findings of this analysis match and complement those observed in earlier studies. They indicate that Bush's war rhetoric was a continuation of, and not a departure from, the genre of war discourse. Textual evidence suggests that the president followed the generic convention despite different situational exigencies and constraints. The analysis demonstrates that he not only strategically misrepresented his case to discourage objection to and win approval for unilateral action but also presented his decision to attack Iraq as the result of thoughtful consideration and careful deliberation within his administration. He developed arguments and laid out evidence that supported the claims that Iraq had links to al-Qaeda and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and possessed and had the ability to deliver chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. In building his case for war, Bush called the public to commit to the cause of the elimination of the threat posed by Iraq and sought congressional support to assume the office of the commander-in-chief.

Explaining the consistency in the presidents' use of the basic components of war rhetoric, Campbell and Jamieson (1990, p. 125) posit that "the essential elements of presidential war rhetoric persist because its functions (...) persist". Given the case of the Iraq War rhetoric, a suggestion can be made that the formula remained relatively unchanged despite the change of the functions it was originally designed to fulfill. In its conventional form, war rhetoric was designed to gather support for a response to an attack. As the Iraq War was a preemptive war that started in the absence of an aggressor's attack, the goal of the discourse was to persuade the public and Congress to legitimate presidential use of war powers for a preemptive response to an adversary's potential attack. Campbell and Jamieson (1990, p. 125) maintain that the formula recasts "the events leading to military intervention as aggressive acts by an implacable enemy" but in the case of the Iraq War, there was no invasion and no single identifiable enemy. The formula worked even though no act of violence was carried out and no one specific, aggressive adversary was identified. Campbell and Jamieson (1990, p. 125) hold that "the narratives characteristics of earlier rhetoric efforts (...) are easily adapted to simplify and dramatize events" but the account of events leading to the Iraq War was complicated and the evidence presented in support of the claims made was at least questionable. The war was about many things and was to achieve many objectives. There were many questions why America was invading Iraq and what America was trying to do. Ultimately, the war was largely the initiative of the US. The UN Security Council refused to support it and congressional approval did not include a formal declaration of war.

The analysis also demonstrates that, in many aspects, Bush's rhetoric against Iraq in 2002 reflected that of his father's discourse constructed a decade earlier. The role of the thesis, the structure of the arguments, and the emphasis on the ultimate goals remained largely the same. The rhetorical forms and techniques to present them were different. Bush's rhetoric lacked the certainty and decisiveness of the

language of his father. His message did not carry the credibility and genuineness of the 1991 speech. It expanded the conceptualization of the enemy and relied heavily on third-party support.

Discussing the rhetorical continuity and shifts in presidential war rhetoric, Lordan (2010, p. 11) states that "In the history of the United States, leaders, disputes, and military capabilities have all changed dramatically, but the basic framework and components of presidential war rhetoric have remained largely the same". While this study corroborates the idea of stability in the use of the genre, it also finds departures from the generic tradition. The analysis of the Iraq War rhetoric in the light of the Persian Gulf War discourse demonstrates that a political speech making a case for war does not need to be built on solid ground. An assumption or a speculation about a perceived threat or danger can be a convincing argument for the use of force. Preemption constitutes a new approach for handling enemies. Explicit and precise objectives are replaced with broad and ambiguous goals, and general language substitutes detailed explanations. Threats do not appear designed to create real pressure on the enemy but rather encourage noncompliance, which could then be used as an alleged reason for war. Unilateral action by the United States is made more acceptable when national security is at stake.

Consistent arguments and clear logic serve their purpose, even if they are not substantiated with verifiable proof which could confirm the truth of the assertions made. A projected sequence of events and predictions of the consequences, if acts of aggression were to be committed by the enemy, work to support the idea that the decision to go to war is dictated by emotions rather than cool calculation. Relevant knowledge needed to make an informed choice whether to go to war is subject to modification as the information to which only the president is privy can challenge the framing of the threat and the legitimacy of the steps to be taken to confront it. The strategies of tapping into the prevailing fears and intensifying the feelings associated with those fears dominate the discourse. Lack of wisdom gained from what the president had encountered and had undergone before he took office does not lead to a loss of credibility. Claims of the president's endeavours suffice to convincingly demonstrate and help to significantly strengthen his integrity. The enemy need not be a single individual in order to serve its purpose of posing a real and tangible threat. It can be conceptualized which recontextualizes the war from that against a specifically designated individual to that against a regime, lifting it beyond politics to the ground of a struggle about values.

One of the questions that emerges from these findings is whether the speech set a rhetorical precedent and whether it will invite other presidents to follow its formula. Research shows that one president's handling of a war influences another president's behaviour and discourse during a crisis. In 1991, lessons were drawn from the Vietnam War, just as were those in 2002 from the Persian Gulf War (Hess, 2006). While the exact impact of the management of the Iraq War on presidential performance will be possible to determine only after the US decides to go to war

again, two suggestions can already be offered. If the promoted perception of a future conflict is that of an issue — thus requiring the president to shape the way in which Americans think about it — then predictably presidential rhetoric will echo the tone of the Iraq War discourse. If, however, the conflict is seen as a condition, presidential war rhetoric will comply with the traditional expectations of the genre of war discourse. Considering the criticism and cynicism that the second Bush's rhetoric has already produced, presidential statements, claims, evidence, and information will most likely be treated with more caution and care. Greater transparency of foreign policy goals and accountability for the means used to achieve them will be required to make a compelling case for a war and win congressional and public acceptance for it. Informal manipulation of the war-making process and claims for ultimate war-making authority are likely to continue but exceeding presidential authority in the interest of national security and carrying out presidential war agendas through legislation might be made harder.

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Facebook influences you more than me: The perceived impact of social media effects among young Facebook users

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ABSTRACT: The popularity and prevalent use of Facebook among young people are common pre-occupations for communication researchers. They focus on unveiling people's motivations, usage behaviour, and gratifications offered by this communication medium. However, little attention has been invested in examining how young people perceive this new type of media consumption and its effects on themselves as compared to others. Drawing on Davison's (1983) third-person effect hypothesis, this research paper investigates the (a) differences in estimated Facebook effects on self versus others, (b) association between the desirability of the message (anti-social versus pro-social) and estimated Facebook effects on self versus others, and (c) association between the type of the message and estimated Facebook effects on self versus others. These relationships are studied with reference to the behavioural component of the third-person effect. Results confirm that Facebook might influence the magnitude and direction of the perceptual gap of media effects.

KEYWORDS: Third-person effect, social media, behavioural component of the TPE, message desirability, message type.

INTRODUCTION

The current popularity and usage of social networking sites (especially Facebook) are high among young people. Thus, it is not surprising that this popular social networking platform has attracted the interest of scholars from diverse areas including communication, psychology, and advertising. Recent studies were mainly intended to cover topics such as people's motivations for using and engaging on the platform,

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people's usage behaviour, their attitude towards privacy, the gratifications related to the use of Facebook as a communication tool, and the benefits of using Facebook as a social learning tool. However, little attention has been invested in the study of *perceived effects* of social networking sites (and, particularly, Facebook) on users themselves versus others (see for instance Tsay-Vogel, 2015).

Research designed to reveal the perceived influence of media is not so recent. It has been previously applied to topics including politics, violence, pornography, or advertising. Nevertheless, exploring people's perceptions of media influence in the context of the continuous development of newer media outlets is still an under-explored domain. Specifically, due to the emergence and development of technology and information tools, it is a must to take into consideration how people perceive the impact of these newer mediums of communication and information, both on themselves and on others. In this context, our interest is to explore how young people (by far, the most avid users of social networking sites, according to statistics) perceive the way Facebook influences themselves or others in what regards taking action on various issues.

Based on the theoretical framework of Davison's (1983) third-person effect (TPE), this paper aims at uncovering if newer media outlets elicit similar effects as traditional media, and under which circumstances these effects occur. More specifically, the aim of this article is to give answers to the following question: Are young people more inclined to perceive themselves or others as being more influenced by the media (i.e., Facebook)? Is the perceived intensity of Facebook influence mediated by other variables (i.e., message desirability and personal relevance of the topic)? Providing answers to these questions might be helpful not only for communication scholars interested in studying mass-media effects, but also for policy and decision makers who would like to take documented and empirically-based decisions.

THIRD-PERSON EFFECT — PERCEPTIONS AND BEHAVIOURS

Third-person effect states that people tend to expect others to be more influenced by media messages than they are. Davison (1983) proposed the TPE hypothesis, namely that people overestimate the impact of media on others, and the way their attitudes or behaviours might be affected. Since then, media scholars have reported solid empirical evidence to support the TPE (e.g., Chapin, 2002, 2013; Cohen & Davis, 1991; David & Johnson, 1998; Davison, 1996; Duck et al., 1999; Gunther, 1991; Hoffner & Buchanan, 2002; Huh et al., 2004; McLeod et al., 2001; Bryant et al., 2000; Perloff, 1993, 1999, 2002; Price & Tewksbury, 1998; Sun et al., 2008), emphasizing that the more negative or controversial the messages are, the stronger the perceived influence on others.

The TPE contains a perceptual and a behavioural component. The perceptual dimension refers to people's belief that exposure to media messages would have a greater impact on others than on themselves. Studies on the perceptual bias identified a stronger occurrence of the effect when the messages are perceived as undesirable and when the issue is personally important (Perloff, 1993). The opposite effect is called first-person perception and appears in connection with positive, desirable messages whose influence is perceived as casting a good light on those who are affected by the content (Andsager & White, 2007). Media effects are also correlated with a second person effect, meaning the self as well as others are affected (Neuwirth et al., 2002).

The TPE is determined by a process called the fundamental attribution error (McLeod et al., 2001). This process refers to people who attribute the negative consequences concerning themselves on situational aspects and on individual characteristics when the focus is on others. People are in need of maintaining a positive image about themselves, a process of ego enhancement (Brown, 1986; Perloff, 1989), or self-serving bias and the need to feel in control (Gunther, 1995). Another circumstance that increases the effect is when another person or group is perceived as being part of the audience of the message in question, thus being more likely to consume and be influenced by a message (Eveland et al., 1999). However, when people feel they are part of the target of a message but they are not influenced by it, they assume the others are more influenced by that particular media content, thus favouring the TPE (White & Dillon, 2000).

While the perceptual component refers to the discrepancy in assessing the influence of media for self and others, the behavioural component proposes that people will act to censor negative media messages associated with a third-person perception bias (Davison, 1996; Perloff, 2002; Salwen, 1998). Previous studies indicated that the reaction of individuals in terms of behaviour towards media content is influenced by their perception of how messages might affect others and what others will do as a consequence of being influenced by those messages (Jensen & Hurley, 2005; Tewksbury et al., 2004).

Therefore, if people assume a certain influence of a message on the public, they will adapt their behaviour to correspond to this assumption, especially through manifesting support for restricting the media content (Gunther & Storey, 2003; Hoffner & Buchanan, 2002; McLeod et al., 2001; Neuwirth et al., 2002). Davison (1983) noted that regarding the censorship of the media, the censors do not admit being influenced by a negative content, nor their in-group, but the other people in general need these protective measures. Therefore, if people overestimate the influence of media on others, they will take action to restrict the potentially harmful content (Golan & Banning, 2008). Yet, as users of certain content, we are less likely to evaluate its effects as harmful to others, so the perception bias and the behavioural component will vary from person to person. Nonetheless, there is insufficient research to affirm that the perception bias will determine real life consequences in terms of behaviour (Gunther & Storey, 2003; Perloff, 1999). The studies conducted in this area measure the

willingness to censor controversial content. Researchers found support for willingness to exert control in relation with violent or misogynistic rap music, pornography, violence, political communication, or advertising of controversial services (e.g., Gunther, 1995; McLeod et al., 1997; Rojas et al., 1996; Salwen, 1998). Emotions may be a mediator between TPP and the behavioural component, as emotions are triggering certain outcomes of a perceived influence. For example, anxiety or anger may lead to information seeking, to active participation, especially in politics, or willingness to ban harmful content (Huddy et al., 2007; Kim, 2016; Kepplinger, 2008). While most research regarding the behavioural dimension examined the support for message restrictions, other behaviours are possible so further research is needed to support the TPE (Wu & Koo, 2001).

Overall, studies have indicated that individuals tend to overestimate media effects on others, but underestimate them on themselves. The perceptual component of this effect emphasizes the gap in estimating media effects on self and others, while the behavioural component deals with how people act based on their assumptions. Both components are dependent on the valence of media content.

PREDICTORS OF THE THIRD-PERSON EFFECT

Previous studies identified a series of moderators that influence the magnitude of the TPE. For example, social distance might be an important predictor, meaning that the relationship of the target with the perceiver, if the perceiver is part of the group in question or not, will determine variations of the TPE (Reid & Hogg, 2005). The effect increases due to the social distance (Meirick, 2005). The concept of reference groups and the resemblance or difference from the self, influence the perceived effects on others. The more different and distant the group in question, the greater the effect (Davison, 1983; White, 1997). The higher impact is correlated with public opinion in a broad sense (Cohen et al., 1988). Self might also be involved in the TPE as those with high self-esteem proved to have an increased third-person perceptual bias (David & Johnson, 1998). People have a set of positive illusions about themselves, their traits, and their abilities to maintain self-esteem. In this context, self-enhancement is an important aspect in determining the TPE. Furthermore, cross-cultural studies found that the TPE was larger in individualistic rather than collectivistic cultures (Lee & Tamborini, 2005). Still, in the case of desirable content, being influenced by a message might mean to be open-minded, smart, responsible, in which case the effect will turn into a first person effect, the self and the in-group members being more influenced than others, as this will cast a positive image on the influenced ones (Duck et al., 1995). First-person effects have been found for prosocial content such as public service announcements, safety, or responsible behaviours (Meirick, 2004; White & Dillon, 2000).

Negative and controversial content such as pornography, misogynistic lyrics, gambling, tobacco and alcohol advertisements, violence, political advertising, magazine advertisements, and video gaming are generally found to determine an increase in the TPE, being perceived as socially undesirable messages (Banning, 2001; Eveland et al., 1999; Golan, 2002; Rojas et al., 1996; Zhong, 2009). There is robust support for the connection between undesirable media messages and TPE (Bryant, Salwen & Dupagne, 2000).

TPE is understudied in relation with Facebook and the perceived influence of this social platform on others, although the psychological mechanisms might support the same pattern of effects in terms of Facebook usage as well (Tsay-Vogel, 2015). If the accessibility of information and control over the target audience for a message are higher, Facebook users might overestimate the effects on others (Mangold & Faulds, 2009). Moreover, besides the level of desirability of media content that triggers variation in TPE, it is possible that the perceived desirability of the medium has the same influence. Thus, if the perceivers estimate that Facebook has negative effects on users, the TPE should be greater, and smaller if Facebook is seen as having a positive influence (Tsay-Vogel, 2015).

Overall, the TPE predicts that others are more influenced by media messages, and a series of moderators such as social distance, audience vulnerability, likelihood of exposure, knowledge, self-esteem, type of content, and level of desirability might determine variations of the effect. The strongest influence is found in relation to negative media content. However, insufficient research has been carried out for new media or with a focus on the behavioural component and, therefore, the present study addresses these two dimensions and further explores the third-person effects.

STUDY GOALS AND HYPOTHESES

In this study, we investigate the TPE in the context of social media, focusing on the behavioural component. Specifically, we seek to explore the differences between estimated Facebook effects on self vs. others (H1), while at the same time looking into the mediated effects of socially desirable messages (H2) and the personal relevance (the degree of importance of the topic) of the content of Facebook messages (H3).

H1. Young people generally believe that they are less influenced by social media messages than others in regards to taking action on various issues.

H2. The intensity of the TPE is influenced by the social desirability of the message. Specifically: Young people believe they are less influenced than others by social media messages to a higher degree when the message refers to a socially undesirable topic than when the message refers to a socially desirable topic.

H3. The intensity of the TPE is influenced by the personal interest people hold for the message. In other words: Young people believe they are less influenced

than others by social media messages to a higher degree when the message refers to a personally irrelevant topic than when the message refers to personally relevant one.

METHOD

Sample

Previous studies showed that students, if not entirely homogenous in terms of socio-demographics, could be a fairly good sample of experiment subjects in various topics research (Nelson et al., 1997). In this study we used a sample of undergraduate (N = 599) and graduate (N = 89) students of a Romanian social-sciences university (N = 688), in order to test the influence of Facebook messages on young people's behaviour. The sample consists of people aged 17 to 39 years old (M = 20.63, SD = 2.37).

Design

To assess the influence of social desirability and personal relevance of social media messages we used a 2x2 experimental design, plus a control group. The 688 students were randomly assigned to one of the five conditions, represented by four types of stimuli, and the control group: socially desirable personally relevant topic (N = 139), undesirable personally relevant topic (N = 140), desirable personally irrelevant topic (N = 137) undesirable personally irrelevant topic (N = 135), and the control group (137).

Stimuli

For the socially desirable, personally relevant message, we used the topic of making the universities safer for students from the point of view of fire protection. This is a highly sensitive topic among young Romanians, after an incident that killed more than 60 young people at a concert because of the lack of fire protection at the location. This was considered a national tragedy and elicited large public debates about fireproofing of public institutions. Dropping the admission exams in state universities was the socially undesirable, personally relevant topic, in the context of the general debate about the continuously degrading state of higher education in Romania. The pension system was chosen as a topic lacking personal relevance, with regards to the poor population (desirable component) and the members of the Romanian Parliament (undesirable component). Pensions of the members of the Romanian Parliament have been the subject of intense debate in recent years in Romania. The level of corruption of Romanian politicians makes the topic socially undesirable, since common people tend to believe that politicians always raise their own pensions, and not those of poor people. However, students in general do not

find this particular topic of interest (because of their young age). The stimuli were short written stories, allegedly viral on the Facebook network "these days", constructed as proposals of changing the current legislation. Both the stimuli and the questionnaire were pretested on a sample of 26 students prior to the experiment.

Measures

The questionnaire used in the experiment contained both pre-test and post-test scales, which allowed for in-depth analysis of the results. The dependent variables were created using pairs of questions testing opinions, attitudes and behaviours of "me" vs. "others". In this study we focus on the behaviour component, measured on a 7-point Likert scale asking about the willingness to participate in a public protest supporting the legislation proposal presented in the stimuli. The intensity of the TPE was measured through the difference between the mean of the "others" and "me" variables, therefore a positive value showing a third-person effect.

FINDINGS

Generally speaking, in the control group, young people believe that others are much more influenced (M = 5.49, SD = 1.26) than themselves (M = 3.85, SD = 1.61) by the articles read on Facebook. Equally, when generally asked about the Facebook influence, even people exposed to the stimuli respond in about the same manner. Specifically, they believe that others are more influenced (M = 5.46, SD = 1.18) than themselves (M = 3.88, SD = 1.54). There is no significant difference between the control group and all other groups in terms of the intensity of the TPE (t test not significant). Not only are people generally convinced that they are much less influenced by FB than others, but they position themselves below the mean of the scale, in the "not much influenced" range, while placing others in the "much influenced" area of the scale. The classic TPE seems to stand in the social media domain, regardless of the personal characteristics of the people or of the stimuli that they might be exposed to, at one particular moment (H1 confirmed).

As far as the behaviour component of the TPE is concerned, the data show a great mean difference between "self" (M = 2.62, SD = 1.78) vs. "others" (M = 4.06, SD = 4.06, SD = 1.53), with people estimating others at about the mean of the scale, and themselves in the area of very low influence.

The differences between the groups are small. Namely, young people exposed to the socially desirable story as compared to those exposed to the socially undesirable story have the same behaviour. Generally speaking, the intensity of the TPE remains the same, with the difference that people estimate that both themselves and others would be a little more influenced by the socially desirable topic. Nevertheless, the differences are negligible (Table 1) (H2 invalidated).

Table 1. TPE based on the desirability of the topic

Social desirability of the topic		Behaviour of self	Behaviour of others	Intensity of TPE
Socially undesirable	Mean	2.31	3.81	1.50
	N	272	272	272
	Std. Deviation	1.65	1.56	1.84
Socially desirable	Mean	2.93	4.31	1.38
	N	275	275	275
	Std. Deviation	1.85	1.45	1.81

Source: Authors.

Contrary to expectations, no first person effect was present at all in the case of the socially desirable topic. At the same time, the mean difference between people willing to participate in a protest supporting a change of legislation proposal in the case of the desirable and undesirable topics is not significant, either for "me" or for "others" (t test is not significant). Nonetheless, the social desirable topics elicit a higher willingness of people to get involved in a protest than a socially undesirable one, but at the same time, people also estimate that others would get more involved in a protest supporting a legislation proposal in the case of the socially desirable topic. We believe that the first person effect was absent, due to the fact that the socially desirable topic was not appealing enough to make them interested in taking action. The lower means for both socially desirable and undesirable topics argue for a low level of involvement in both cases. We will further address this in the Limitations section.

However, the nature of the topic and its relevance to the subjects questioned showed significant differences in regards to the intensity of the behaviour component of the TPE ($t = 2.713$, $df = 545$, $p < .01$) (H3 confirmed).

Table 2. TPE based on the personal relevance of the topic

Personal relevance of the topic		Behaviour of self	Behaviour of others	Intensity of TPE
Personally irrelevant	Mean	2.21	3.87	1.66
	N	269	269	269
	Std. Deviation	1.52	1.59	1.70
Personally relevant	Mean	3.02	4.24	1.22
	N	278	278	278
	Std. Deviation	1.92	1.44	1.91

Source: Authors.

The personal relevance of the topic seems to matter more in eliciting a third person effect. However, when analysing the means of people's estimates of selves and others' behaviours, only in the case of others' behaviour for personally relevant topic people estimate the willingness to participate in a protest above the mean of the 7-point scale (M = 4.24).

Taking into consideration the combination of both relevance of the subject and social desirability, the differences regarding the intensity of the TPE at the behaviour level are significant for the "personally relevant, socially desirable" topic (post hoc ANOVA Tukey test differences significant, F = 6.988, df = 546, p < .01) (see Table 3 for the intensity of the TPE measures – general means of difference in behaviour "me" vs. "others").

Table 3. General means of the intensity of the TPE: difference in behaviour "me" vs. "others" based on the nature of the topic

Type of topic	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Personally relevant desirable	138	.90	1.710
Personally irrelevant undesirable	132	1.42	1.592
Personally relevant undesirable	140	1.55	2.047
Personally irrelevant desirable	137	1.87	1.777

Source: Authors.

The intensity of the third person effect was much higher for the personally relevant, desirable topics, compared to personally irrelevant, desirable topics, which argues for a minimum (if existent at all) effect of the social desirability of the topic.

To sum up, we confirmed a general TPE elicited by the Facebook messages among young people. At the same time, the social desirability of the message does not seem to play a great role in changing the direction or the intensity of the effect, while the personal relevance of the topic seems to decrease the intensity of the TPE at the behaviour level.

DISCUSSION

The main goal of this research was to investigate the TPE and its prevalence among young people in the context of social media. With a specific focus on the behavioural component of the TPE, our research was intended to discover and examine the differences in estimated Facebook effects on self versus others regarding the readiness to take action on various issues (i.e., focusing more on the behavioural component and less on the perceptual one); the relationship between the TPE and the social desirability of the message, and the relationship between the TPE and the personal importance attached to the message. The data from our research provide significant support for

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TPE in the context of social media, with rather similar estimated effects compared with those elicited by traditional media outlets (see for instance Golan & Banning, 2008; Johansson, 2002; Price et al., 1997; Tsfati & Cohen, 2004).

In general, our findings are consistent with Davison's (1983) TPE hypothesis, initially designed with reference to traditional mediums of communication. Furthermore, when applied to newer communication mediums, the results follow the same direction in the sense that when asked about taking action (i.e., about the willingness and readiness to participate in a public protest supporting the legislation proposal presented in the stimulus material), young Facebook users tend to report a stronger influence of Facebook on others than on themselves, irrespective of any other moderator variables (i.e., the social desirability of the message or the personal importance attached to the message content). These results are in line with other recent studies, revealing the "discrepancy that lies in the estimated use and effects of Facebook between self and others" (Tsay-Vogel, 2015, p. 11).

The first hypothesis stated that young people generally believe that others are more influenced by social media messages as compared to themselves with reference to taking action on various issues. This hypothesis proved to be true, meaning that young people perceive that Facebook is influencing others more than themselves. Despite the general pattern, which could be easily criticized, the results at this level might be interpreted as valuable from at least two connected points of view. First, we noticed that, despite its fashionable character, popularity, and heavy usage especially among young people, Facebook is a tool whose influence tends to be neglected. Paradoxically, although they spend much time using Facebook for various activities, young people tend to place themselves out of its influence and consider others much more vulnerable. One possible explanation for this result might be linked to what scholars refer to as an "ego enhancement" cognitive strategy. Specifically, irrespective of media form and content, people have a tendency towards making "self-serving judgments in order to maintain their self-esteem and sense of control" (Price et al., 1997, p. 527). This means that perceiving others as being more vulnerable and even more negatively affected by media is motivated by people's need for ego enhancement (Boyle et al., 2008) and that this holds true in social media contexts as well. In other words, the perceived TPE could be much more related to self-positioning oneself in the best light rather than thinking badly of other people.

Another important aspect to consider in relation to our results confirming the prevalence of TPE among young people with reference to social media contexts is linked to Facebook's rather controversial character. Although it encompasses a range of virtually good things, among which the possibility to keep in touch with people from distant places and the almost instant communication facilities are the most mentioned, Facebook activities are sometimes regarded as time-consuming and counter-productive. Therefore, somebody's acknowledgement of being influenced by Facebook news in order to take action on various topics could mean automatic damage to his or her public image.

Besides the similarities with previous studies, there is at least one main difference. Namely, young people from our study did not "overestimate the influence that mass communications have on attitudes and behaviour of others" (Davison, 1983, p. 3). Instead, our findings suggest that the significant difference between self and others comes from people's tendency towards "largely underestimating media effects on themselves" (Golan & Banning, 2008, p. 209). As noted earlier, this means that the TPE could have its origins in people's need to self-position in a "safe place" or best light and preserve a high level of self-esteem rather than in any badly intentioned behaviour towards others.

The second and the third hypotheses from our study referred to the intensity of the TPE. The second hypothesis focused on the social desirability of the message and the way it might influence the intensity of the TPE effect, in the sense that a socially desirable story could drive people to consider that they are more influenced than others (i.e., being the sign for the presence of reverse TPE or the so-called first person effect). This second hypothesis was invalidated, since the intensity of the TPE remains the same in the case of both socially desirable and undesirable topics. These results contradict our expectations, mainly coming from previous research studies (i.e., Gunther & Mundy, 1993; Price et al., 1997), which stated that the pro-social nature of a message aimed directly at a socially desirable outcome might lead individuals to find themselves more influenced than others (i.e., pro-social messages lead to higher FPE), whereas when an intended media stimulus is perceived to lead to socially undesirable behaviours, it might determine people to rate others as more vulnerable (i.e., antisocial messages lead to higher TPE). One possible explanation for these results could be linked to the fact that there is such a generalized attitude towards placing oneself in the best light possible that, irrespective of its social desirability, individuals believe that others are more exposed and thus, more influenced, and more vulnerable to this relatively new medium, subject to yet unclear valence evaluation. This holds particularly true in social media contexts, where individuals are exposed to such a tremendous amount of information and news that it is fairly hard to clearly filter the socially desirable topics from the undesirable ones.

The personal relevance of the topic and its influence on the intensity of the TPE was tested in the third hypothesis, in the sense that a personally irrelevant topic could lead to higher levels of TPE. The hypothesis was confirmed, suggesting that a personally relevant story leads people to admit that, not only are the others influenced, but themselves as well. With reference to the connected influence of both the social desirability of the topic and its personal relevance, findings prove that a socially desirable topic regarded as personally relevant, compared with a socially desirable topic regarded as personally irrelevant, could lower the TPE. In other words, in line with other recent research studies (Schweisberger et al., 2014), our findings show that, irrespective of its social desirability, the more relevant the topic, the lower the TPE among young Facebook users.

The above-mentioned findings could be explained with reference to the social distance corollary, suggesting that the nature and intensity of the TPE depends "on the identity of the comparison others" (Tsay-Vogel, 2015, p. 12). Particularly, TPE diminishes when the social distance between self and other decreases, whereas TPE increases when others increase in generality (also see McLeod et al., 1997). Thus, applying these possible correlations to Facebook, there is a high possibility that, when young people were asked to evaluate the attitudes and behaviours of "others", they could have evaluated people in their respective social networks, including their close friends. Therefore, in this case, the psychological distance between self and others is insignificant to the extent that it leads to biased or limited perceptions. If users are evaluating the impact of Facebook on their own friends, the motivation to preserve their self-esteem and to position themselves in the best light possible might be very high, and, thus, users might be less likely to report their own friends as being susceptible to social media influence. Reporting their own friends as being influenced by Facebook, implicitly means acknowledging self-influence. Thus, due to this flimsy delineation between self and others in the context of the TPE, researchers should take into account that it is necessary to point out the conceptual and methodological challenges involved when defining and evaluation "hypothetical others" (Tsay-Vogel, 2015, p. 12).

LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

There are some limitations in this research. The first one is the lack of extensive studies referring to the TPE in the context of social media outlets. The few existing studies with reference to this topic could not allow for a more consistent methodological design and for empirically-based comparisons. Another limitation is related to the measures for the perceived impact of Facebook, which could be biased due to the wording and the manner of presenting the statements. As documented in other studies, it is highly important to take into account the way of phrasing a statement when measuring perceptions, attitudes and behaviours. For example, as Tsay-Vogel (2015, p. 13) suggests, it is possible that people could be more willing to report effects of Facebook on themselves (i.e., first person effect could be higher) if statements were phrased in the active voice rather than in the passive voice.

The intensity of the stimuli is arguably an important limit, especially for the social desirability dimension. Even though there was a pre-test of the stimuli in the sense of general appreciation of the social desirability of the topics, we believe that stronger negative connotations of the socially undesirable content might nuance the results.

Furthermore, as briefly explained earlier, drawing from the social distance corollary, the lack of a clear definition of "others" could be another limitation of the present research. Future research studies should take into consideration the fact that it is critically important to define "others", since the delineation between "generalized" (people in general) and "specialized" (close friends) others could have a serious impact on the magnitude and intensity of the TPE. It is important to admit

that these delineations are relevant mainly for such homogenous samples, as was the case in our study.

Finally, the convenience sample limits the generalisability of the results, especially due to the relative homogeneity of the subjects in the experiment in terms of age and education.

CONCLUSIONS

Our research offers support for Davison's (1983) TPE hypothesis, in a different cultural context. Thus, TPE is a generalized effect that consistently applies to newer media outlets, namely Facebook. In particular, our main findings show that TPE exists among young Romanian users of Facebook and that the intensity of TPE varies according to the personal relevance of the social media topic to which people are exposed. Facebook messages perceived as personally relevant lead to lower levels of TPE as compared to personally irrelevant messages; the social desirability of the messages does not seem to have a role, neither with reference to themselves, nor to other people.

These findings could be used as starting points for future research studies referring to either Facebook in particular or to other, even newer mediums of communication. Due to the quick evolution of social networking sites and to the fact that research on the medium must be continually updated, since even the slightest "change in format may have significant ramifications for social media research" (Schweisberger et al., 2014, p. 411), the applicability and functioning of TPE, as an already classic theory of media effects studied with reference to new mediums of communication, might be a sign that the theory is still valid and could be used by both scholars assessing mass media effects and policymakers in the broad areas of communication, media and advertising.

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Book reviews

Daphne Skillen (2017). *Freedom of Speech in Russia: politics and media from Gorbachev to Putin.* **New York: Routledge, pp. 363.**

The book under consideration is a comprehensive analysis of the state, role and status of freedom of speech in Russia over the period of thirty-one years, from the beginning of so-called "perestroika" in 1985 to the present day. Taking into account the burden of Russian historical legacy, the author traces the process of emergence, progression and decline of freedom of speech in contemporary Russia and attempts to uncover its logic. Overall, the study aims at an explanation of the historical, psychological and sociological reasons that prevented Russian society from establishing long-lasting freedom of speech and resulted in the "gradual but relentless erosion of the freedoms" (p. 1), gained in the first years after the collapse of the USSR.

The study raises a number of questions, but the central of them, as formulated in the introduction, runs as follows: "Why and how did the dream of democracy and free speech go so wrong, and what can be learned from it?" (p. 1). Indeed, after the three-quarters of a century of Soviet political reality, "glasnost", that was introduced by Gorbachev and was understood as "great autonomy and independence for the media" (p. 122), resembled a dream and caused euphoria in Russian society. In the few years that followed, life in the country transformed dramatically and media professionals for the first time encountered freedom with no restrictions. Yet it did not last long. The media soon "reverted to their traditional role in Russia, as an organ for somebody or something other than truth-telling" (p. 57). In the lifetime of one generation, media once again became "Kremlin mouthpieces" (p. 1) and television was transformed into "instruments of war and hate" (p. 1). So what was it that prevented Russian journalists and society in general from retaining its freedom and how did a nation's dream so quickly turn into a nightmare?

These are not easy questions and obviously a great number of reasons have contributed to the current state of affairs. The study under consideration aims at an objective analysis of all the possible factors and is based on numerous academic and non-academic sources, interviews with prominent Russian politicians, media and law experts and representatives of the media world, as well as on the abundant personal experience of the author, who holds degrees from universities in London, Sydney, and Colorado, and for many years was living and working as a journalist and media critic in Russia.

The study is divided into two parts with the first providing a broad analysis of the freedom of speech in Russia, its historical status and philosophical base, and the second in detail discussing the political history of contemporary Russia and the place of media in it. Thus, the first part begins with an analysis of perceptions of freedom in Russian culture, where this concept can be expressed via two different words, namely "svoboda" and "volya" (p. 17). This difference explains why,

as illustrated by various surveys, "censorship does not necessarily have negative connotations for Russians" (p. 18). The study compares Western human rights theories which protect the individual at the expense of the powers of the state with Soviet collective thinking, where the state was considered not as "a potential violator of freedoms, but as their guarantor" (p. 21). Additionally, there is the Orthodox Church that challenges freedom and human rights on the grounds that human nature contains sin and thus freedom of choice cannot be regarded as an absolute value (p. 25). The consequences of the growing politically-motivated influence of the Church in modern Russia are illustrated in the book on the example of the trial of Pussy Riot — "a moment when the modern, western, secular mindset clashed with religious obscurantism" and the latter won (p. 27).

The study then proceeds to the analysis of the history of Russian newspapers — institutions "imposed from above" (p. 36) by Peter the Great — and censorship that constantly accompanied it from the very beginning. During the Soviet times, "the media were meant to serve the state" (p. 37) and even "glasnost" was invented not to support free speech, but as a means to reform the economy (p. 39). It was only during Yeltins's era when the conditions for freedom of speech "to exist and flourish" (p. 40) in the country were finally created.

The first Russian laws on the the mass media are then discussed in the book, though, as rightfully states the author, "it is not laws alone that encourage free speech, but the political climate" (p. 42). Progressive laws that were created at the beginning of the 1990s were quickly amended when Putin came to power. For instance, the term "extremist" in contemporary Russian laws is "so vaguely defined that it can apply to almost anyone who displeases the authorities" (p. 45). The expansion of "state-owned and state-affiliated media" (p. 48) also contributed to the current state of freedom of speech in Russia under the president, who is not only from the KGB, but is "proud of it" (p. 49).

Among the reasons for the demise of free speech in Russia the study also mentions "a predatory oligarchy concerned with its own interests", "a passive public" (p. 57) and the Soviet legacy — "its illusions, isolationism and deformed thinking" (p. 57). Alas, journalists themselves were a product of that system and often belonged to so-called "Homo Sovieticus" — "a strange and absurdist breed that had mutated after years of fear and lies" (p. 57).

Both fear and lies and their influence on the exercise of human rights are discussed in the book. Both fear and lies have a long history in Russian and Soviet culture, where the state tried to "liberate the world from its chains, while crushing its citizens under poverty and terror" (p. 60). In such circumstances, lies were often invented "out of fear and a sense of survival" (p. 90), as a response to the too strict demands imposed on people that were often "impossible to fulfil" (p. 90). Throughout its history, there was and is a lot of fear in Russian society. As a result, claims the author, there is a "bizarre relationship to lies" (p. 90) and "people may accept what they see on television without actually believing it" (p. 73). Unfortunately, television

in Russia is a dangerous instrument, "opium of the people" (p. 73). It is watched by 90 per cent of the population on top of "political apathy, conformism and subservience to the ruling class" (p. 73).

The study attempts to uncover the rationale behind these characteristics of Russian society and examines "feelings of insecurity and competitiveness" (p. 95) felt by the country where a historical serfdom lasted longer than in any other part of Europe. Time passes, but "the same unresolved and unchanged problems continue to suffocate Russia" (p. 99) and the 20th century has only contributed to it. Historical revisionism has never been conducted in Russia, as all the political leaders after Stalin feared that a trial into the crimes of communists "would result in civil war" (p. 102). History of killings and repressions against its own people is still an overly sensitive issue and to address it people need "support of government, the judiciary, education and media" (p. 102). Without this long-needed operation on the nation's conscience, there is "no healing process and no catharsis" (p. 102).

Overall, the first part of the study discusses the historical reasons behind Russian "dysfunctional society" (p. 49) and provides its explanation. The Russian audience was not gullible, but cautious and inured to "distortions of reality after a legacy of seventy years of lies, unverifiable information and isolation from the outside world" (p. 49), and it was not the foundation that was necessary for establishing long-lasting freedom of speech. People easily succumbed to demagogy (p. 106) and passively lost the chance for a better future.

The detailed process of how it happened is described in the second part of the book. It is devised into four chapters and chronologically examines freedom of speech under Gorbachev, during the coup of 1991, in the Yeltsin era, and under Putin. "Perestroika" and "glasnost" are examined in the book as the major achievements of Gorbachev. Yet in 1986 the Chernobyl disaster — the world's worst nuclear disaster — "was reported in five short sentences" (p. 118). But in the next few years the unprecedented rise of freedom of speech happened. Eventually, "glasnost" became the policy that "largely contributed" to the fall of Gorbachev himself and the Soviet Union (p. 39). "Liberalisation turned into democratisation" (p. 149) and the society proved it was capable of defending its new freedom during the three-day coup in August 1991. The coup is then described in the book, as well as its significance for freedom and democracy in the country. Yet, states the author, twenty years later perceptions of the coup have dramatically changed, showing that "over the last two decades people have lost the confidence they had in themselves as political actors" (p. 164).

The Yeltsin era is discussed in great detail in the book, as it was the time when the country "enjoyed a degree of free speech unprecedented in scope and duration" (p. 187). The author claims that Yeltsin "freed society from fear" (p. 187) and protected media freedom. Yet, "the right to free speech needs people prepared to speak freely" (p. 192) and Russian media appeared to be not prepared. Instead, free and honest journalism quickly became "a hostage to politics and money" (p. 212). The

introduction of advertising and sponsorship and following enormous amounts of money corrupted media professionals and in the late 1990s bribery and corruption were flourishing almost everywhere in the main national media (p. 216).

Finally, the last chapter of the book examines the fate of freedom of speech and the destruction of media pluralism in Russia under the Putin regime. Once in power, "Putin declared that journalism was like spying" (p. 279) and began the Kremlin's war with the media, states the author. The rise of suspicion and paranoia in modern Russia is explored in the study together with the fate of the once-independent NTV channel and the emergence of the new state-controlled media. The most horrific events in modern Russian history, such as the Kursk disaster, Nord-Ost siege, Beslan, proved the "Kremlin's obsession with media and with controlling its image" (p. 301). Moral outrage did not happen. The society, as well as media professionals, largely accepted "Putin's increasingly authoritarian regime" (p. 304). The relationship between the state and media returned to its feudal prototype.

To conclude, the book examines the role and state of freedom of speech in Russia over the last thirty-one years and reflects the underlined processes and factors that contributed to its current condition. The study comprises hundreds of stories and examples from Russian political history that overall create a comprehensive picture of tragedy of Russians, who may be considered hostages of "superpower status at the expense of ordinary people" (p. 61). As such, the study can be highly recommended to media professionals, academics and students, engaged with the issues of media and freedom of speech, as well as to everyone interested in the history of contemporary Russia and in understanding it.

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The 10th Anniversary of the Polish Communication Association (PTKS)

Developments and Challenges of Media and Communication Studies in Poland

Wrocław, Poland, April 15–26, 2017

Photo: Participants of the Conference

In April 2017 Polish Communication Association (PCA) celebrated its 10th anniversary. The conference to summarize developments and map challenges for future research was organized in Wrocław. The choice of the city was not a coincidence. PCA was funded in Wrocław; its members agreed that there's no better place to celebrate and to discuss the future of the association.

PCA was established by 38 scientists who agreed that it was absolutely essential in order to properly function and develop in their field. In 2007 association had 46 members and in 2016, after nine years, this number was noticeably higher – 241 scientists from all over the country and abroad (honorary members) decided to work together. All the members meet regularly during congresses every three years. The association is also well known abroad from its cooperation with International Communication Association (ICA) and being the initiator of the Central and Eastern European Communication and Media conference. PCA is also the publisher of *Central European Journal of Communication*.

A two-day conference (April 25–26, 2017) took place at the University of Wrocław Library, Institute of Journalism and Social Communication and the Institute of Political Science (University of Wrocław). During numerous panel sessions the participants discussed not only past achievements and present trends in media, journalism or communication studies, but also talked about the future of those fields and the place of media studies in relation with other disciplines. The conference gathered approx. 200 participants from Poland. Among the keynote speakers were also colleagues from other countries – Marian Berezhnaya (Russia), Svetlana Bodrunova (Russia), Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska (Poland), Sergey Korkonosenko (Russia), Natalia Milewska (Romania), Svetlana Pasti (Finland), Eva Połońska-Kimunguyi (UK), Lilia Raycheva (Bulgaria), Anda Rožukalne (Latvia), Gabriella Szabó (Hungary) and Jaromir Volek (Czech Republic).

Photo: Professor Walery Pisarek among the organizers of the Conference — Sandra Wolna, Julia Trzcińska, Róża Smolak, Lucyna Szot, Paulina Barczyszyn-Madziarz, Waldemar Sobera, Mateusz Bartoszewicz

It was one of the last occasions to meet the First Honorary Member of the Polish Communication Association, our mentor — Professor Walery Pisarek.

The anniversary was also a perfect occasion to spend time in less formal occasions such as the dinner after the first day of the conference, as well as other meetings in smaller groups, that proved right the thesis that Wrocław is indeed a meeting place!

Text: Julia Trzcińska   Photo: Waldemar Sobera

The 67th Annual International Communication Association (ICA) Conference
Interventions: Communication Research and Practice
San Diego, USA, May 25–29, 2017

Photo: The participants of the panel: Agnieszka Hess, Agnieszka Stępińska, Dorota Piontek, Paweł Surowiec, Sven Engesser, Václav Štětka, Frank Essser

The Polish Communication Association (PCA) organized a panel "(New) Media and Political Communication in Europe" during the 67th Annual meeting of ICA in San Diego. The

goal of that panel was to bring together a wide range of scholars from several European countries to draw a picture of contemporary trends in political communication, in particular populist political communication. The panelists presented their empirical studies on: (1) the ways in which political parties in hybrid media systems use social media as mobilization platforms for political participation among its citizenry, (2) the news media depiction of the various political parties' electoral proposals and of the political attitudes of protest, (3) amount of attention paid by the media to populist political parties, and (4) a relation between the politicians' self-presentation on social media and their image created by the journalists. Overall, the panel provided an opportunity to discuss theoretical and methodological approaches toward populist political communication in the era of online media. The PCA session was chaired by Dorota Piontek. In her opening speech, Dorota Piontek introduced activities of the PCA and presented the latest issue of *Central European Journal of Communication*.

The first paper was presented by Václav Štětka from Loughborough University (United Kingdom) and Pawel Surowiec from Bournemouth University (United Kingdom). The paper included results of the analysis of the digitally-stored Facebook data from the 2013 Czech and the 2015 Polish parliamentary election campaigns. The comparative design of this study enabled to capture similarities and differences of campaigns to better understand how political parties in consolidating democracies adopt and adapt to hybridized election settings. Agnieszka Stępińska from Adam Mickiewicz University (Poland), Dorota Piontek Adam Mickiewicz University (Poland), and Agnieszka Hess from Jagiellonian University (Poland) shared their findings on media visibility and (new) media activity of populist political actors in Poland. The paper collected and compared data on traditional media coverage and social media activities of Paweł Kukiz and Janusz Korwin–Mikke. Through content analysis the paper examined a relation between the politicians' self-presentation and their image created by the journalists. Susana Salgado from University of Lisbon (Portugal) examined the political parties' communication and the media coverage of the 2015 national election in Portugal, the first election in the aftermath of the Euro Crisis. Through content analysis, the paper looked at the news media (television, online newspapers, and print media) depiction of the various political parties' electoral proposals and of the political attitudes of protest, and investigated how immune electoral political communication is to populist discourses. The panel continued with presentation by Sven Engesser from University of Zurich (Switzerland). The Author provided a review on the scattered literature on online populism and presented an integrative theoretical framework. He looked at commonalities between the logic of populism and the logic of online media and further mapped areas for future research.

After all the presentations Frank Esser from University of Zurich (Switzerland), who served as session respondent, shared his comments and suggestions on both the results and the methodology of the presented studies.

Text and photo: Agnieszka Stępińska

10th Central and Eastern European Communication and Media (CEECOM) Conference
Critique of/at/on periphery?
Ljubljana, Slovenia, June 15–17, 2017

Photo: Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska and Elena Johansson

The 10th conference of CEECom in Ljubljana was dedicated to discussions on the periphery and its criticism in the areas of communications and media. Over 50 researchers from Central and Eastern Europe discussed geopolitical, economic, social and ideological dimensions. It is worth mentioning that approx. 20 percent of conference participants were researchers from Poland. Organizers of the conference pointed out that CEE could be considered as a periphery of media and communication studies. This might be due to the fact that topics discussed in CEE countries are mostly related to new or poorly researched issues. Therefore, the opportunity to present them during the conference seemed to be crucial. Moreover, the scientists have been underlining the role of critical studies. It seems that it was possible to draw attention to the multifaceted nature of the periphery which was the subject of the 10th CEECOM conference.

Overall, 16 panel sessions and two plenary sessions were organized. The conference participants were welcomed during the opening session by the Dean of the Faculty Social Sciences — Rado Bohnic, the Conference Chair and ECREA President — Ilija Tomanic Trivundza as well as the representative of ECREA CEE Network — Zrinjka Perusko. Zlatan Krajina from the University of Zagreb (Croatia) presented his research e *Why Periphery Matters: The Shifting Visibility of the Balkans and the Articulation of Crisis in Europe.* The second plenary session took place on Friday. It was dedicated to populism and its connection with the media. John Downey from the Loughborough University (UK) presented his research about the *Populism in and by the media in the UK's EU Referendum.*

The 16 panel sessions were different in character and research topics, including *Journalistic identities and practices in flux; Media industries and digital technologies – a critique; Law and policy — a view from periphery*; *Political communication — critical notes from the periphery;* or *The good, the bad and the ugly: exposing audiences and political critique.* Particular attention should be paid to panels *Exploring interaction between prime ministers and the media in Finland, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden* and "*Invested*" *journalism, partisanship and propaganda*, where scientists from the University of Wrocław presented their research.

During the panel "*Invested*" *journalism, partisanship and propaganda* participants discussed the media coverage of the crisis in Ukraine by Polish, Ukrainian and Czech media.

Conference participants had the opportunity to take part in a special workshop entitled *Mapping research funding in CEE* that was organized by ECREA. The purpose of the workshop was to identify the ways in which research initiatives in the region are being funded. Another interesting event that took place in a form of a roundtable. The discussion *Exhibiting the political: Criticality, visibility and state power* was initiated by the Slovene Communication Association. The meeting was moderated by Ilija Tomanic Trivundza. It was attended by both media (newspaper *Memorandum*, newspaper *Vecer*) and science representatives (Educational Research Institute; Institute for Strategic Solutions).

Text: Róża Smolak   Photo: Jacek Nożewski

10 Years of Central and Eastern European Communication and Media (CEECom) Conferences

Conferences CEECom — meetings of researchers from Central and Eastern Europe

Year	Meeting	Place	Conference subject
2008	1 Forum	Książ Castle (Poland)	1st Polish-Czech-Slovak Forum of Political and Communication Sciences
2009	2 Conference	Brno-Telcz (Czech Republic)	Channels of Transition
2010	3 Conference	Bratislava (Slovakia)	Media in Crisis. Crisis in Media
2011	4 Forum	Cracow (Poland)	Convergence: Media in Future, Future in Media
2012	5 CEECom	Prague (Czech Republic)	Media Power and Empowerment
2013	6 CEECom	Kaunas (Lithuania)	Liquidity, Fragmentation, and Individualization in the Mediascape
2014	7 CEECom	Wroclaw (Poland)	Changing Media and Democracy: 25 Years of Media Freedom and Public Sphere in Central and East Europe
2015	8 CEECom	Zagreb (Croatia)	The Digital Media Challenge
2016	9 CEECom	Tartu (Estonia)	Media and Communication Studies: Bridging Disciplines, Bridging Countries
2017	10 CEECom	Ljubljana (Slovenia)	Critique of/at/on Periphery?
2018	11 CEECom	Szeged (Hungary)	Communicative Space – Political Space

The Polish Communication Association organized the 1st Polish-Czech-Slovak Forum of Political and Communication Sciences in Książ Castle (Poland) 10 years ago in 2008. The next meetings of scholars from Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia took place in Brno-Telcz (Czech Republic) in 2009 and Bratislava (Slovakia) in 2010. The 4th Forum was organized in Cracow (Poland) in 2011. Consortium of Central and Eastern European

Communication and Media (CEECom) was established during the 5th conference in 2012 in Prague (Czech Republic). The main aim of consortium is to integrate researchers in all region and to organize annual conferences. Since the creation of the consortium, CEECom conferences have been held in Kaunas (Lithuania) in 2013, Wroclaw (Poland) in 2014, Zagreb (Croatia) in 2015, Tartu (Estonia) in 2016 and Ljubljana (Slovenia) in 2017. The next conference will take place in Szeged in Hungary in 2018.

Text: Róża Smolak

Call for Panels and Papers

Submitting a "closed"

Panel proposals of maximum 500 words should panel proposal include the rationale and title of proposed panel, name, email, and affiliation of the Chair/Moderator and up to five members of the panel, and brief abstracts (maximum 250 words) for each participant's contribution. Please include names, emails and affiliations of panel participants in the same entry with their contributions.

Call for "closed" panels ends on 30th November, 2017. The notification of acceptance will be sent until 10th December, 2017.

Submitting an "open" panel proposal

Panel proposals of maximum 500 words should include the rationale and title of proposed panel, name, email, and affiliation of the Chair/Moderator. Note that, "open" panels do not include participants. Participants can apply to panels from 15th December, 2017.

Call for "open" panels ends on 30th November, 2017. The notification of acceptance will be sent until 10th December, 2017.

Submitting a paper

Individual paper proposals addressed to one of the proposed topics or panels could mention the title of the desired panel (other topics regarding CEE issues and/or beyond communicative or political space are welcomed.) Abstracts (maximum 250 words) will be evaluated by one member of the Scientific Committee.

Call for papers starts on 15th December, 2017 and ends on 20th January, 2018. The notification of acceptance will be sent until 15th February, 2018.

The submitting page for papers will be available here from 15th December, 2017.

http://ceecom2018.hu/
https://www.facebook.com/CEECOM2018/

Series: *Studies in Communication and Politics* 5

Peter Lang Publishing 2017

Poland's New Ways of Public Diplomacy

By Beata Ociepka

This book analyzes when and how Poland implemented public diplomacy. The author explains it as a form of external political communication of governments conducted in cooperation with non-state actors to position the country internationally. The Polish case illustrates how a mid-size country in Europe attempts to impact the public opinion formation abroad while implementing soft power tools. Since 2004, when Poland joined the EU, the country has used public diplomacy to inform the world about its achievements. Poland's public diplomacy has been strongly oriented on Europe and shaped by geopolitics. It integrated transmission and network models of communication. The Polish model reflects the relevance of public diplomacy domestic dimension and the focus on foreign politics on memory.

Series: *Komunikowanie i Media / Communication and Media* 25

Wydawnictwo University of Wroclaw Press, 2017

Quantitative and Qualitative Methods in Communication Studies

Edited by Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska and Waldemar Sobera

The book is dedicated to the role of different methods in communication studies. The authors present used by them quantitative, qualitative and hybrid research methods, such as quantitative and qualitative content analysis, the Social Network Analysis, critical discourse analysis, the Manifesto Research Group method.

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